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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (The Party of Islamic 
Liberation) stands apart from better known radical 
Islamist movements by its apparent opposition to 
the use of violence. But its views are highly radical, 
advocating the overthrow of governments 
throughout the Muslim world and their replacement 
by an Islamic state in the form of a recreated 
Caliphate. It has grown quickly in Central Asia and 
been met with a heavy-handed repression that 
threatens to radicalise members still further and 
sow the seeds of greater Islamist extremism in the 
region. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir first emerged among Palestinians in 
Jordan in the early 1950s. It has achieved a small, 
but highly committed following in a number of 
Middle Eastern states and has also gained in 
popularity among Muslims in Western Europe and 
Indonesia. It began working in Central Asia in the 
mid-1990s and has developed a committed 
following inside Uzbekistan, and to a lesser extent 
in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Kazakhstan. Estimates of its strength vary widely, 
but a rough figure is probably 15-20,000 
throughout Central Asia. Its influence should not be 
exaggerated – it has little public support in a region 
where there is limited appetite for political Islam – 
but it has become by far the largest radical Islamist 
movement in the area. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is not a religious organisation, but 
rather a political party whose ideology is based on 
Islam. It aims to re-establish the historical 
Caliphate in order to bring together all Muslim 
lands under Islamic rule and establish a state 
capable of counterbalancing the West. It rejects 
contemporary efforts to establish Islamic states, 
asserting that Saudi Arabia and Iran do not meet the 
necessary criteria. According to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the 
Islamic state is one in which Islamic law – Sharia – 
is applied to all walks of life, and there is no 
compromise with other forms of legislation.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to reject violence as a form 
of political struggle, and most of its activities are 
peaceful. In theory, the group rejects terrorism, 
considering the killing of innocents to be against 
Islamic law. However, behind this rhetoric, there is 
some ideological justification for violence in its 
literature, and it admits participation in a number of 
failed coup attempts in the Middle East. It also has 
contacts with some groups much less scrupulous 
about violence. But despite the allegations of 
governments, there is no proof of its involvement in 
terrorist activities in Central Asia or elsewhere. 
Government responses have been contradictory and 
often ineffective. In much of the Middle East, the 
organisation is banned from acting openly, and 
many of its members have been imprisoned. 
Central Asian governments have taken particularly 
harsh stances, with Uzbekistan leading the way by 
arresting and sentencing thousands of members to 
long prison terms. In some other Muslim countries, 
such as Indonesia, Hizb ut-Tahrir acts more or less 
openly, as it does in much of Western Europe. 
Wider policies of governments in Central Asia have 
probably contributed to the growth of Hizb ut-
Tahrir, particularly in Uzbekistan. Repression by 
the Uzbek government has given it a certain 
mystique among some of the population, and the 
lack of alternative forms of political opposition or 
expression of discontent has ensured that it has 
attracted members from the mass of those opposed 
to the regime for political reasons. Poor economic 
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policies have further undermined support for the 
government, and induced discontent among traders 
– a key Hizb ut-Tahrir constituency. Uzbekistan’s 
restrictive border regime has also increased support 
for a group that advocates a universal Muslim state, 
with no national distinctions. 
For a small but significant group of predominantly 
young men, Hizb ut-Tahrir gives an easy 
explanation for their own failure to achieve change 
in their personal lives, in society or in the state 
system. It provides young men with some meaning 
and structured belief in an era of otherwise 
confusing and difficult social change. It also offers 
occasional material benefit and social support in 
states characterised by extreme poverty and social 
breakdown.  
Repression of its members, and often of those 
merely associated with them, has radicalised the 
movement, and had an impact on wider societies. 
Given the radical ideas of the group and the 
conspiratorial nature of its political struggle, it is 
understandable that governments are concerned 
about its impact on stability. But too often 
governments in the region, particularly in 
Uzbekistan, use Hizb ut-Tahrir as an excuse for 
their own failure to carry out political and 
economic reform and for continuing suppression of 
religious activity outside narrow official structures. 
Too often the international community has turned a 
blind eye to this repression. The West, and the U.S. 
in particular, is in danger of damaging its reputation 
in the region by close association with Central 
Asian dictatorships.  
The international community has a key role to play. 
It should resist temptation (and requests from 
Central Asian governments) to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir 
since driving it underground would only make it 
more secretive and conspiratorial and probably 
more radical. Rather, it is in Western interests to 
press states such as Uzbekistan to take urgent 
measures to change the environment in which Hizb 
ut-Tahrir thrives. Closed political systems, lack of 
freedom of speech, lack of economic progress, and 
unreformed and brutal security services all 
contribute to the growth of radical opposition 
groups. It is in the security interests of the 
international community to ensure that political 
opposition to unpopular regimes does not by 
default coalesce into a more militant group, with a 
more violent and dangerous agenda than the 
present-day Hizb ut-Tahrir.  
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
To the Government of Uzbekistan: 
1. Undertake with the participation of specialists 
on Islam and independent experts a major 
review of policy towards religious groups and 
the political opposition. 
2. Legalise secular opposition groups such as 
Birlik and permit other political groups, 
particularly those working with youth, who 
recognise the existing constitutional order to 
operate freely. 
3. Allow legal channels for expression of 
discontent by opening the media to discussion of 
religious and political issues and permitting 
criticism of the government and security forces. 
4. Repeal restrictive decrees on cross-border 
trade and small business, which have 
provoked wide popular discontent and further 
support for radical opposition to the state. 
5. Allow the muftiate and imams greater freedom 
to teach Islamic theology and permit 
authoritative figures to emerge who are 
capable of challenging Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideas 
from the stance of orthodox Islam. 
6. Take serious measures to reform the security 
sector, limiting the powers of the police and 
the procuracy and enhancing the independence 
of the courts. 
7. Implement the recommendations of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture to end the 
systematic torture and killing of prisoners, 
which increases sympathy for Hizb ut-Tahrir 
and radicalises prisoners. 
To the government of Tajikistan: 
8. Open up the political system by permitting 
opposition parties to operate more freely, 
allowing more freedom of expression in the 
media, and ending harassment of the Islamic 
Renaissance Party that is likely to drive 
supporters of political Islam to seek more 
radical alternatives. 
9. Avoid excessive reliance on the security forces 
to deal with Hizb ut-Tahrir, develop more 
understanding of the issue among religious 
leaders, NGOs and community groups, and 
actively encourage them to work with 
vulnerable young people. 
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To the government of Kyrgyzstan: 
10. Reject calls for more severe measures against 
Hizb ut-Tahrir members, which will merely 
increase their radicalism and gain them sympathy. 
11. Reverse the slide into authoritarianism of the 
past two years and end policies designed to limit 
the influence of secular opposition parties. 
12. Take active measures to reform law 
enforcement structures, including more ethnic 
balance in recruitment and increased education 
in religious matters for police officers and 
officials; 
To the U.S. and other members of the 
international community: 
13. Avoid close identification with the repressive 
policies of Central Asian regimes against 
Muslims and take a firmer line against abuses 
of human rights, torture and unfair judicial 
processes with regard to Hizb ut-Tahrir 
members; 
14. Prioritise in public diplomacy human rights, 
religious freedoms and disagreement with 
those Central Asian government policies that 
undermine long-term stability and living 
standards. 
15. Press governments of the region to take active 
measures to open the political system, further 
economic reform, liberalise cross-border trade 
and fight corruption within elites. 
16. Improve information-gathering and sharing on 
Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
17. Resist calls to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir in Western 
countries, which would reinforce repressive 
policies in Central Asia and push the party 
underground and into more radical positions. 
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RADICAL ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA: RESPONDING TO HIZB UT-TAHRIR 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The nature and role of the Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami 
(The Party of Islamic Liberation) is one of the least 
understood phenomena in the political, social, and 
religious situation in Central Asia. The party’s 
emergence over the past five years has been a 
significant political development, widely used by 
governments in the region to explain their failure to 
achieve political and economic liberalisation and 
considered by local elites as a major threat. 
At least since the 1980s scholars and policymakers 
have debated the role of Islam in Soviet and post-
Soviet politics. Some argued that the Soviet system 
had at least suppressed if not completely nullified 
the potential for Islam to become a credible 
religious and political force. Others anticipated that 
a Muslim rebellion would bring about the Soviet 
demise in Central Asia, or that an Islamist 
movement would quickly fill the ideological and 
power vacuum left by the communist party’s 
collapse.  
In fact, Islamic movements played almost no role in 
the Soviet collapse and in the unexpected 
independence of the Central Asian states in 1991. 
Only in Tajikistan did an Islamic party become 
active in the limited social mobilisation of the late 
Soviet period. Even there the Islamic Renaissance 
Party (IRP) had a relatively limited social following 
and was but one of multiple opposition groups. 
Although the IRP became the lead player in the 
United Opposition, popular support for political 
Islam as such seems to have been limited and to 
have declined rapidly in the aftermath of the civil 
war.  
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) had 
even less success in generating support for its 
“Islamic Jihad” and political-military agenda, 
although it did put fear of “Islamic terrorism” and 
“religious extremism” at the top of domestic and 
international agendas in the region. Still, the failure 
of the IRP, the IMU, and other Islamist activists to 
generate a widespread following suggested that 
Islam had little serious political potential in the 
region after all.  
The rise and apparent growth and staying power of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir has, therefore, come as a surprise. 
Whereas this movement was almost unheard of in 
the region five years ago, it now claims thousands 
of adherents, and it has become a leitmotif in 
government justifications for authoritative actions 
and repressive policies. 
As a clandestine organisation, Hizb ut-Tahrir is 
challenging to understand and to assess. There have 
been few adequate attempts to research its ideology 
and political potential.1 Lack of solid information 
 
 
1 The best detailed overview of the growth and ideology of 
the transnational party is Suah Taji-Farouki, A 
Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search of the 
Islamic Caliphate (London, 1996). Extremely useful work 
has been done in Central Asia by the Uzbek scholar 
Bakhtiyar Babadjanov. See inter alia his, ‘O deyatelnosti 
‘Hizb ut-Tahrir al-islami’ v Uzbekistane’ [On the activities 
of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-islami in Uzbekistan], in Aleksei 
Malashenko and Martha Brill Olcott (Eds.), Islam na 
postsovetskom prostranstve: vzglyad izvnutri (Moscow. 
2001), pp. 153-169. Ahmed Rashid has provided a 
colourful assessment in Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in 
Central Asia (London, 2002). For a fairly balanced critique 
of his work, see Hizb ut-Tahrir (Britain), “The Inaccuracies 
of the Book ‘Jihad – the rise of militant Islam in Central 
Asia’ by Ahmed Rashid”. ICG has also covered aspects of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir in previous publications; see especially ICG 
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has hampered government responses to the 
organisation, both in Central Asia and elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, understanding Hizb ut-Tahrir in 
Central Asia, its goals, methods, and social 
following, is important in developing state policies 
for dealing with this opposition force.  
A better understanding is also central to forming 
appropriate international strategies, especially when 
U.S. involvement in the “war on terrorism” has 
dramatically escalated the international presence in 
the region. Both the Central Asian states and the 
international community must carefully choose 
strategies and policies for dealing with political-
religious groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, if they are 
to avoid creating a threat to state and regional 
stability.  
                                                                                    
Asia Briefing, The IMU and the HT: Implications of the 
Afghanistan Campaign, 30 January 2002.  
II. HIZB UT-TAHRIR’S GLOBAL 
AGENDA 
A. ORIGINS 
Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in 1952, in what was then 
the Jordanian controlled part of Jerusalem, by the 
Palestinian Islamic legal scholar and political activist 
Taqiuddin an-Nabhani (1909-1977). He was educated 
at Al Azhar University in Cairo and later worked in 
Palestine in the Islamic courts, eventually becoming a 
judge. After 1948 an-Nabhani was a leading member 
of East Jerusalem discussion circles among politically 
active Palestinians, many of whom later became 
involved in the Ba’athist movement of Arab 
socialism. An-Nabhani was also attracted by the 
ideals of Arab nationalism, but in contrast to many 
contemporaries, he based his political views on the 
centrality of Islam in politics. 
Like many Arab political parties that emerged after 
the 1930s, Hizb ut-Tahrir took on characteristics of a 
modern political party, with a program and structures. 
Many of these parties found inspiration in early 
Leninist ideas, echoing the concept of the party as a 
revolutionary vanguard. Most took on an ideology of 
nationalism or socialism, or both. Taqiuddin an-
Nabhani ‘was…one of the first Arab intellectuals to 
argue the case for a modern political party using the 
constructs of Islamic discourse.’2 Nevertheless, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir had much more in common in terms of 
political structure with secular parties such as the 
Ba’athists, later to become a ruling party in Iraq and 
Syria, than it did with the major Islamic political 
movement, the Muslim Brotherhood.3  
Almost from the beginning Hizb ut-Tahrir acted as a 
non-constitutional party, the Jordanian authorities 
having rejected its application for legal registration, 
but it still functioned fairly openly and as part of the 
wider political opposition. It gathered popular support 
in the 1950s in Jordan and the West Bank, and some 
in Beirut, where an-Nabhani was forced to live in 
exile, but overall its influence on the wider political 
scene of the Middle East was limited. 
 
 
2 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, op. cit., p. xi. 
3 Ibid., p. 7. It is not clear if An-Nabhani was ever a 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood but it clearly had a 
significant influence on his thinking, and the new group 
attracted many members from the Brotherhood.  
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It picked up more support in the 1960s, and by 
1968 the leadership considered that this was 
sufficient to seize power, not just in Jordan, but in 
Iraq and Syria also, led by pockets of backing in the 
armed forces in each country. The coup failed, as 
did further attempts in Jordan in 1969 and 1971 and 
in southern Iraq in 1972.4 
These failures and the subsequent arrest of many 
members seem to have led to a sharp decline in 
enthusiasm and activity. The original premise of 
the party was that as in the seventh century, it 
would take thirteen years to follow the Prophet 
Mohammed’s path in creating an Islamic state. The 
inability of the party to achieve its stated aims led 
to a loss of members and some ideological 
confusion. An-Nabhani died in 1977, having seen 
no results, and the party continued to decline into 
the 1980s. He was replaced by Yusuf Sheikh Abdul 
Qadeem Zaloom, a founding member and also a 
Palestinian. But wider reactivation of the party only 
really began in the early 1990s, as a wave of 
interest in political Islam swept through the Muslim 
world, and events such as the Gulf War, radicalised 
parts of Islamic society.  
The popularity of the party had already spread 
beyond Jordan and Syria to North Africa, Turkey 
and South-East Asia. The repression of Hizb-ut-
Tahrir in the Middle East led some of its members 
to set up new chapters in Western Europe. It 
quickly gained ground among second-generation 
immigrants and now has important branches in the 
UK, Germany, Sweden and Denmark. With the 
Soviet collapse, it also started working in Central 
Asia, where it began growing rapidly in the second 
half of the 1990s. 
Although much organisational work may have 
shifted to Muslim communities in the West, the 
leadership still revolves around Palestinians in 
exile, mainly in Jordan. Abdul Qadeem Zaloom, 
who was probably resident in Amman, died in 
April 2003. He was succeeded by another 
Palestinian, Ata Abu-l-Rushta, a civil engineer who 
studied in Cairo and previously headed the Jordan 
section. He has spent time in prison in Jordan and 
has been linked to the party since 1955.5 Given his 
background, it seems unlikely that there will be 
 
 
4 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
5 ICG interview, Dr Imran Waheed, spokesperson, Hizb ut-
Tahrir (UK), 5 June 2003, London; Taji-Farouki, A 
Fundamental Quest, op. cit., p. 34 
significant change in the party’s ideology under his 
leadership, although it is not known how much real 
influence the Amir has, compared with other active 
leaders. 
B. IDEOLOGY 
The stated aims of Hizb ut-Tahrir are straightforward 
and grandly ambitious – to recreate an Islamic state, a 
utopian interpretation of the Caliphate that once ruled 
the Muslim world,6 in which Islamic law would be 
introduced immediately and in full. There is no 
gradualism or compromise in the program for change: 
Hizb ut-Tahrir views all other political, social or 
religious programs as at best irrelevant, since it argues 
that other Islamic groups can do little until they 
concentrate on establishing an Islamic state in the full 
sense.  
The ideology has changed little from that outlined 
in an-Nabhani’s writings in the 1950s and 1960s 
though there have been continuous efforts to build 
on his interest in developing Islamic rules for all 
aspects of life and provide an alternative Islamic 
view on modern problems.7 Indeed, his writings 
have remained the basis for Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
ideology to the extent that they form an essential 
canon of belief which is difficult to challenge 
without undermining the essence of the party. 
His approach to Islam and politics distinguished 
Hizb ut-Tahrir from two major trends in Islamism 
in the modern era. On the one hand, the more 
traditional Islamic parties, such as the original 
Muslim Brotherhood, sought to implement aspects 
 
 
6 Hizb ut-Tahrir’s understanding of the Caliphate is 
decidely ahistorical. The Caliphate as a single entity under 
the command of a caliph who receives obedience from all 
and has religious authority has not existed at least since 850 
AD. Later offices of the caliphate, and particularly that 
claimed by the Ottomans, were largely symbolic posts used 
for foreign policy purposes. The final formal office of the 
Caliphate was disbanded by Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk 
in 1924. 
7 An-Nabhani was convinced that the Koran and the 
hadiths contained sufficient basis for legal decision in all 
aspects of life, as interpreted by authoritative scholars. The 
list of issues on which Hizb ut-Tahrir has issued rules and 
opinions is endless: from buying and selling shares to test-
tube babies and cloning. Sometimes these verge on the 
esoteric: in 1982 there was even a discussion of whether a 
Muslim astronaut should be required to pray. See Taji-
Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, op. cit., p. 57. 
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of Islam within existing constitutional frameworks, 
a type of Islamic reformism, which concentrated on 
gradual change through education, and legal 
reform. An-Nabhani rejected this gradualism 
completely, arguing that only a radical 
transformation of society would produce a change 
in the lives of Muslims. 
On the other hand, there were the various followers 
of Sayyid Qutb, who took up Islamic radicalism. 
Unlike early Islamic reformers, an-Nabhani 
rejected all attempts to compromise Islam with 
Western ideas of constitutionalism or nationalism. 
Hatred of the West, and particularly of the British,8 
informed all his ideological writings. But he did not 
follow Qutb in rejecting modernity; indeed Hizb ut-
Tahrir more than most Islamic groups has 
embraced modern technology and idioms, even its 
political methodology. While it claims to be based 
on early Islamic history, the party owes much to 
modern revolutionary movements such as 
Leninism.  
In religious matters, an-Nabhani developed an 
independent viewpoint from the four major legal 
schools of Islam. Observers who would like to push 
him into the ‘Wahhabi’ camp for political reasons 
will have trouble doing so on the basis of his 
religious ideology: his beliefs are clearly not in line 
in many cases with the Hanbali school of legal 
interpretation that many ‘Wahhabi’ groups follow.9 
His independent approach means that much of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir’s teaching on Islamic matters is 
considered heterodox by leading scholars in the 
major schools of Islam.  
1. The Islamic state 
Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects existing attempts to establish 
Islamic states as not sufficiently radical. Its vision 
of an Islamic state is absolute: 
 
 
8 He particularly disliked the British, whom he termed ‘the 
summit of unbelief’ for their role in the destruction of the 
Caliphate in 1924. Britain plays an important role in Hizb 
ut-Tahrir’s view of international relations, with frequent 
writings claiming that its role in the Middle East is part of 
an ongoing struggle for influence with the U.S. 
9 Along with many Hanbali adherents, An-Nabhani rejected 
tradition and custom, ‘urf and ‘ada, as the basis for law. 
Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, op. cit., p. 61. This is 
important in Central Asia, since it means both Wahhabi 
groups and Hizb ut-Tahrir campaign against what they 
view as pre-Islamic rituals, including pilgrimages to sacred 
places, and some aspects of funeral rites.  
For a land to be considered an Islamic state, 
every single article of the country’s 
constitution, every rule and law, must emanate 
from the Islamic Sharia.10 
The party accepts no compromises with other forms 
of political structure or legal provision. Sharia must 
be applied completely and immediately for any 
state to call itself Islamic. Existing states that 
consider themselves Islamic are rejected as falling 
far short of the ideal. Iran is considered far too 
gradualist, with large elements of its political 
structures derived from European political systems 
(elections, a parliament, and so forth) and many 
policies, according to Hizb ut-Tahrir, not fully 
based on Islamic principles: its foreign policy, for 
example, is criticised as infected by Iranian 
nationalism and state interests. Similarly, Saudi 
Arabia, as a monarchy, does not meet Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s exacting standards.11  
The details of what an Islamic state would look like 
are outlined in a range of literature produced by the 
party. Some is quite detailed but little is said on 
actual mechanisms of power. Nevertheless, the 
party has produced a draft constitution, which 
sketches the major provisions of such a state. It is a 
strange mixture of anachronistic elements from the 
medieval Caliphate, placed alongside elements of 
the modern state. According to one scholar, “an-
Nabhani attempted to resurrect models reflecting 
the socio-economic life of societies much less 
complex than today’s, making little allowance for 
the needs and circumstances of the contemporary 
age”.12 
The basic elements of the state would be the ruler, a 
Caliph, elected by a Majlis al-Ummah, or assembly, 
in turn elected by the people. Political parties 
would be permitted, provided they were based on 
Islamic ideology, and they would be called upon to 
hold the Caliph to account, within the set 
framework of the Sharia. 
An Amir would control military affairs and external 
relations. There would be no diplomatic relations 
with ‘imperialist’ states, such as Britain and 
America, and there would be a state of war with 
Israel. The Islamic state would refuse to join 
 
 
10 Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK), “Media Pack”.  
11 ICG interview, Dr Imran Waheed, Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK) 
spokesperson, 5 June 2002, London. 
12 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, op. cit., p. 67. 
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international organisations such as the UN and in 
general would be in a state of jihad (struggle) with 
unbelievers. 
The main planks of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s economic 
policy are a return to the gold standard and distatste 
for capitalism but what exactly would replace it is 
very vague, though parts of the constitution look 
like a somewhat Islamicised socialism. It is not 
clear how the state would finance its wide-ranging 
responsibilities to provide health, education and so 
forth.13 
Women would be ‘basically segregated from men’, 
although permitted to take posts in government, 
engage in trade, and other activities.14 Non-
Muslims would be permitted to follow their own 
beliefs and customs.15 
The Islamic state proposed by Hizb ut-Tahrir is a 
utopian Islamic ideal that few Muslims would 
recognise as either attainable or desirable. Members 
do not show much interest in the detail of Islamic 
statehood – there is nothing to discuss in this area, 
since all is considered to have been decided. In many 
ways, it is based less on the desirability of developing 
a state, than on the psychological need to believe that 
a great Islamic polity could once more emerge to 
dominate world affairs and stand up to Western 
nations, much as the USSR used to counterbalance 
U.S. power. Indeed, there are many parallels between 
the Soviet state and the Islamic state proposed by 
 
 
13 ‘The only thing that will save the world from the 
corruption of this Capitalist economic system, the public 
company system, the usurious banking system and the 
inconvertible paper money is the abolishment of this 
corrupt Capitalist economic system … To save the world 
from this malaise, the usurious banking system and the 
inconvertible paper money standards must be abolished and 
a return to the gold and silver standards initiated’. Hizb ut-
Tahrir, The turbulence of the stock markets: their causes 
and the Shari’ah rule pertaining to these causes. Al-
Khilafah Publications (London, 1998), p. 18. 
14 Most of an-Nabhani’s The Social System in Islam, Al-
Khilafah Publications (London, 1999), translated from 
Arabic, is devoted to the role of women in society. This is 
also a burning obsession for many members. Compared 
with some other fundamentalist Islamic groups, Hizb ut-
Tahrir is considered relatively moderate in this area. 
Women are allowed to work and men to shake women’s 
hands. Women must wear headcoverings, but the face and 
hands may be left uncovered. 
15 The ‘draft constitution’ is included in Taqiaddin an-
Nabahani, The System of Islam, Al-Khilafah Publications 
(London, 2002), translated from Arabic, pp. 115-164. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, including the presumption of constant 
revolution/jihad with other powers. 
The absolute nature of their goal and the lack of 
realism in their vision make Hizb ut-Tahrir unlikely 
to emerge as a major political force with mass 
appeal in any country, but the nature of its political 
structures has ensured longevity as similar fringe 
movements have faded away or merged with other 
groups.  
2. Political methodology 
Insistence that the method of political struggle is a 
critical part of its ideology distinguishes Hizb ut-
Tahrir from other Islamist groups.16  
The party’s writings elaborate three stages of 
political struggle, based on its interpretation of the 
historical mission of the Prophet Mohammed in 
establishing the first Islamic state: 
The First: The stage of culturing; this 
involves finding and cultivating individuals 
who are convinced by the thought and 
method of the party. This is necessary in 
order to formulate and establish a group 
capable of carrying the party’s ideas. 
The Second: The stage of interaction with the 
Ummah (wider Muslim community) in order 
to encourage the Ummah to work for Islam 
and to carry the Da’wah (message) as if it 
was its own, and so that it works to establish 
Islam in life, state and society. 
The Third: The stage of taking the 
government and implementing Islam 
completely and totally, and carrying its 
message to the world.17 
The first stage is the most important in present 
party activity and one of the keys to its longevity. It 
is based on finding appropriate members and 
moulding them to its thinking. An-Nabahani writes: 
‘Taking them through this culturing process 
 
 
16 The resemblance of Hizb ut-Tahrir to early Leninist political 
groups is frequently noted by researchers, notably its emphasis 
on maintaining political purity of membership rather than a 
mass following, its attraction to conspiratorial methods of 
organisation, and its rejection of all other movements’ tactics 
as inadequate for bringing about change. 
17 Hizb-ut-Tahrir, The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for 
Change. Al-Khilafah Publications (London, 1999), p. 24.  
Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 
ICG Asia Report N°58, 30 June 2003 Page 6 
 
 
requires that each one of them assumes the role of a 
beginner (student), whose mind has to be reshaped 
anew’.18 This ‘reshaping of minds’ is the most 
effective part of the strategy, enabling Hizb ut-
Tahrir to establish small but very strong groups of 
individuals fiercely committed to the cause.  
The second stage involves: ‘Collective culturing of 
the masses…through organising lessons in the 
mosques, conferences, lectures, places of public 
gathering, newspapers, books and leaflets…’19 Hizb 
ut-Tahrir is very effective at spreading its views 
through wide publication of books and leaflets in 
multiple languages and a network of well-run 
websites20 that provide access to most of the party’s 
literature. 
Through these two stages of political work, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir claims that it can develop mass 
understanding of its ideas (although not necessarily 
mass membership), and most importantly that it can 
persuade influential figures in politics, the military 
and elsewhere to act in accordance with its program 
and aims. The party actively attempts to recruit 
well-educated members of society, particularly 
those in positions that allow them to influence 
popular opinion. 
Getting from this position – wide acceptance of 
ideas, and some influence on those who are capable 
of influencing policy – to establishment of an 
Islamic state is the essence of the third stage of 
political struggle. It is this stage, the actual seizure 
of power, and the establishment of the Islamic 
state, that is most murky in the literature.  
In most of its writings Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects 
participation in parliamentary democracy, or any 
alliances with other political parties to gain power. 
Nevertheless, it has compromised its stance on 
elections in some countries – it even had a member 
of parliament for a short period in Jordan – but this 
seems to be a controversial point inside the 
movement. Hizb ut-Tahrir candidates were 
 
 
18 Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, Structuring of a Party, Al-
Khilafah Publications (London, 2001), translated from 
Arabic, p. 11. 
19 Methodology, op. cit., p. 35. 
20 Among them are www.Hizb-ut-tahrir.org and 
www.khilafah.org; there are also individual national sites, 
and sites run by Hizb ut-Tahrir but without explicit 
acknowledgement, such as www.muslimstudents.org, and 
www.1924.org. 
permitted by the party to contest parliamentary 
elections in Yemen in 2003, but only under strict 
conditions, primarily that they publicly proclaimed 
their ‘rejection of the Western capitalist system’, 
announced they were ‘working to change the kufr 
systems and establish Islam in their place’, and 
used the Qu’ran as their sole election program.21 
There is little doubt about Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
disregard for democracy. It rejects the concept as a 
Western, anti-Islamic invention and is not 
interested in acting as a party within an open 
political system. A recent publication claims: 
‘Democracy …is considered a kufr system, it is in 
clear contradiction with the Qu’ran and Sunnah’.22  
Such views are accepted by members in Central Asia. 
One activist told ICG: “Democracy means freedom of 
opinions and freedom of business activity – all this is 
in contradiction to Islam”.23 A Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet 
issued in Tajikistan says: “Democracy has drowned 
Muslims in a swamp of humiliation, and led to their 
alienation from each other…”24  
This rejection of democratic means has prompted 
discussion of how the party expects to achieve 
power. An important distinction is between what it 
considers its task – explaining to people that a 
Caliphate is vital – and actually bringing it into 
being, which is the responsibility of the wider 
ummah. One member in Central Asia explained: 
‘We conduct a political struggle; our task is not to 
build the state ourselves, but explain to people how 
to build the state’.25  
What then is Hizb ut-Tahrir’s advice to the wider 
Muslim community on how to construct the Islamic 
state? One option is clearly to persuade existing 
leaders that they need to adopt its proposals. Members 
seem to have attempted to do this on a number of 
occasions. They claim to have met with the Libyan 
leader, Colonel Gaddafi, to advise him on how to 
build an Islamic state, but ended up in prison. They 
 
 
21 Hizb ut-Tahrir (Yemen), “The ruling on participating in 
parliamentary elections”, 25 April 2004, p. 2. 
22 Ibid. 
23 ICG interview, Hizb ut-Tahrir member Aravan, Osh 
region, January 2003. 
24 Hizb ut-Tahrir (Tajikistan), “Muborizai hukumati 
Tojikiston bar ziddi ahli da’vat,” [‘The struggle of the 
Government of Tajikistan against the chosen people’], 3 
March 2003. 
25 ICG interview, Osh province, April 2003. 
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also apparently met with Ayatollah Khomeini in the 
early days of his rule in Iran.26 But they have had no 
success in their attempts at persuasion, and so the 
question has arisen of whether they are prepared to 
resort to violent action.  
3. Attitude to violence 
It is widely reported that Hizb ut-Tahrir, both in 
Central Asia and beyond, eschews violence to 
achieve its ends. Some human rights activists have 
argued that it is essentially a peaceful group that 
operates only in the realm of ideas and propaganda. 
It has never been proven to have been involved in 
any violence in Central Asia, and in its other global 
activities it has generally pursued its aims through 
peaceful propaganda. It is strongly opposed to U.S. 
policy in the Middle East, but does not call for 
terrorist actions against America. Indeed, it claims 
to be opposed to terrorist activity and asserts that 
the killing of innocent civilians is against Islamic 
law.27 Its literature is straightforward, claiming that 
‘…military struggle is not the method of re-
establishing the Khilafah’.28 As one member puts it: 
“To help Iraq is the duty of every Muslim. But to 
help with a gun in your hand is stupid – what is 
needed is to build the Caliphate”.29 
Yet the view that Hizb ut-Tahrir is opposed to 
political violence per se is mistaken. The situation is 
much more nuanced than most researchers allow. To 
understand its position, it is important to stress that 
the theoretical basis of its political activity is the 
historical example of the Prophet Muhammed. The 
basis of non-violence is that Muhammed did not 
initially use force during his early life in Mecca; 
instead he voiced his objections to the misdeeds of 
rulers and gathered followers around him.30  
Yet Hizb ut-Tahrir is clear in its call for existing 
regimes in Islamic countries to be overthrown and 
replaced by an Islamic state. How then does it 
expect to come to power and establish an Islamic 
state if it refuses to take violent action? The first 
point is that Hizb ut-Tahrir expects to have 
 
 
26 ICG interview, Dr Imran Waheed, Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK) 
spokesperson, 5 June 2003, London. 
27 ICG interview, Sajjad Khan, active member, Hizb ut-
Tahrir (UK), London, 5 June 2003.  
28 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Method to Re-establish the Khilafah. 
Al-Khilafah Publications, London. 2000. pp. 68-69. 
29 ICG interview, Karasu, Osh province, April 2003. 
30 Methodology, op. cit., p. 36. 
achieved a mass following for its ideas before 
assuming power. It opposes the idea of seizing the 
state and then forcing society to accept an Islamic 
order, in contrast to persuading society to accept 
the ideas, which would lead, seemingly inexorably, 
to a change in regime.31 
But even in these circumstances, there is likely to 
be a need to use some kind of force to remove 
recalcitrant regimes. One scholar explains: 
 …in practical terms an-Nabhani argued that 
a regime could be brought down through acts 
of civil disobedience such as strikes, non-
cooperation with the authorities or 
demonstrations, or through a procession to 
the palace or presidential residence, provided 
that the movement enjoys exclusive control 
and leadership… Alternatively, it could be 
toppled through a military coup executed by 
forces that have agreed to hand over power to 
the movement.32  
However, Hizb ut-Tahrir argues that as a political 
party it does not undertake any physical or violent 
actions. So how can it justify involvement in a 
military coup?  
Hizb ut-Tahrir itself eschews the use of force 
[but]… …internal sources argue that groups 
pledging the party their back-up can use 
arms.…if society stands against the regime 
its removal even by military force does not 
constitute an act of violence: this would be 
the case only if the party were to kill its 
opponents to arrive in power, for example.33 
Here an important concept in party thinking 
emerges that explains some of its apparent 
contradictions. Hizb ut-Tahrir has developed the 
concept of seeking outside assistance (nusrah), by 
 
 
31 ‘Our aim is not to assume power first and they try to 
induce the ummah to embrace our ideas. Our intention is 
rather to induce the ummah to convey the call as we do, so 
that the entire ummah becomes the party’.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, 1962, cited in Taji-Farouki, A 
Fundamental Quest, op. cit., p. 76; Sunday Telegraph, 7 
August 1994. 
32 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, op. cit., p. 102. 
33 Ibid., p. 104. 
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studying the assistance Muhammed received from 
Arab tribes in his conquest of Medina.34 
The objectives of seeking nusrah are twofold: first 
to protect the party and enable it to continue 
propagating its ideology; secondly, ‘to reach the 
government, so as to establish the Khalifah and 
bring back the rule of Allah in life, the state, and 
society’.35 What this means in practice is not 
certain, but it could clearly be interpreted as 
seeking military assistance from other groups, 
should members be experiencing considerable 
harm, or in the broadest sense to establish the 
Caliphate. In this way, the party remains committed 
to its intellectual and political struggle but does not 
rule out seeking assistance from other groups, 
including some that will take military action on its 
behalf. 
4. Jihad  
The party’s interpretation of jihad is also somewhat 
confused at first glance. An-Nabhani’s interpretation 
seems to be limited to jihad as the responsibility of 
the Caliphate, and Hizb ut-Tahrir argues that jihad is 
not part of the method by which the Caliphate can be 
rebuilt.36 A member in Kazakhstan explained: “There 
are two types of jihad: the physical and the spiritual. 
The physical jihad will come after the establishment 
of the Caliphate. The spiritual is for now’.37 
Certainly the HT view of jihad is not primarily that 
of an inner struggle against desires in order to 
purify oneself. One party writer comments: 
“…when the Western nations seek to change the 
whole concept of jihad, to mean nothing but 
 
 
34 ‘…when the society and the Ummah became rigid or 
indifferent towards the party, the party reviewed its study 
of the sirah of the prophet, in order to receive guidance 
from it… The party’s conclusion from all this reassessment 
of the situation is that the action of seeking the Nusrah 
(help) … is also part of the method which must be followed 
when the society becomes rigid or indifferent towards those 
who convey the Da’wah and the harm increases on them. 
Therefore the party added seeking the Nusrah, to the 
actions which it carries, and it started to seek it from the 
people who are in a position to give it’. 
Methodology, op. cit., p. 38-39. 
35 Ibid., p. 39. 
36 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, op. cit., p. 109. This 
contrasts Hizb ut-Tahrir with radical groups inspired by 
Qutb, who called for immediate jihad against corrupt 
Muslim leaderships. 
37 ICG interview, Shymkent, June 2003. 
struggling against one’s own inner desires, this will 
invariably give them a distinct advantage as it will 
render the Muslims defenceless”.38 He claims that 
‘It is a consensus from the scholars of Islam that 
jihad is “fighting the kuffar to remove the obstacles 
in the ways of making Allah’s word the highest”.39 
Although the main jihad is not expected until the 
Caliphate is introduced, this does not mean that 
Muslims should not fight defensive wars. Thus, 
Muslims, Hizb ut-Tahrir members included, are 
enjoined to fight against an invader if attacked: 
The fact that the Party does not use material 
power to defend itself or as a weapon against 
the rulers is of no relevance to the subject of 
jihad, because Jihad has to continue until the 
day of judgement. So whenever the 
disbelieving enemies attack an Islamic 
country, it becomes compulsory on its 
Muslim citizens to repel the enemy.40 
There is much loose rhetoric about jihad in party 
leaflets, which does not always underline these 
distinctions. And there is clearly some potential for 
a defensive jihad to be interpreted in a very broad 
fashion. But the main thrust of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
thinking seems to have remained intact: the jihad 
will come when the Caliphate is established.  
5.  The record 
Interpreting these ideological contortions is 
difficult but they seem to mean that Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
in theory at least, plans a peaceful political struggle 
in most cases, seeking to increase its numbers and 
influence until its opinions reach a critical mass in 
society. This will somehow lead to a bloodless 
overthrow of the existing order. In the peculiar 
idiom of Omar Bakri Muhammed, the colourful 
former head of the British branch of the party, ‘The 
 
 
38 Sidik Aucbur, “The True Meaning of Jihad”, Khilafah 
Magazine, May 2003. The author rejects as fabricated the 
much quoted hadith that says ‘I have returned from the 
small Jihad to the big Jihad”. The Sahaba enquire: “What 
is the big Jihad?’. The Prophet said ‘The Jihad against 
inner desires’. The author also rejects the interpretation of 
jihad as defensive war, citing numerous battles by Muslims 
against other peoples. However, he does agree that 
Muslims are forbidden from forcing the non-Muslim to 
embrace Islam.  
39 Ibid. 
40 The method to re-establish the Khilafah, op. cit., pp. 126-
127. 
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nation of Islam is like a woman… Inject her with 
thought until she becomes pregnant and then she 
will deliver the baby of the Islamic state’.41 
In other cases, though, it clearly feels that the 
obligation of Muslims is to overthrow non-Muslim 
rulers, and this applies to those in a position to do 
so. Hence influential figures in the military – 
whether Hizb ut-Tahrir members or not – might be 
persuaded to mount a coup to remove an 
unbelieving leader. ‘A bloodless coup is a perfectly 
acceptable way of achieving the overthrow of a 
government’, says one HT leader.42 Most coups are 
not bloodless, of course, but it seems that the least 
violent method of overthrow is important: “We 
don’t want to encourage any kind of civil war, for 
example”, says the same spokesperson. 
Pakistan offers an interesting theoretical example, 
although the potential for any significant Hizb ut-
Tahrir influence seems minimal. The party there 
says it distinguishes between the Pakistani high 
command and junior officers and soldiers. The 
generals are the ‘agents of international 
imperialism’, says a Hizb leader, while the rest of 
the army is their potential ally.43 In a press release, 
Hizb ut-Tahrir urges Pakistani soldiers to follow 
Mohammad bin Qasim’s example at a time when 
‘kafirs (non-believers) are transgressing the honour 
of Iraqi sisters’.44 
Historically, the party’s record provides no 
evidence of it being involved in terrorist activity 
against civilians, or in military actions against U.S. 
or Western interests. But there is good evidence of 
its involvement in a series of failed coups and 
attempts to overthrow governments in the Middle 
East. Some of the evidence for these incidents is 
disputed, but it seems clear that Hizb ut-Tahrir was 
involved in an attempted coup d’etat in Jordan on 
several occasions in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
It was also accused of involvement in an attack on 
the military academy in Egypt in 1974, interpreted 
 
 
41 Sunday Telegraph [London], 7 August 1994. 
42 ICG interview, Dr Imran Waheed, Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK) 
spokesperson, 5 June 2002, London. 
43 ICG interview with a Hizb ut-Tahrir (Pakistan) member, 
Islamabad, 7 April 2003. 
44 Press release at:  http://www.khilafah.com.pk/pr/ 03023 
pr.html. Mohammad bin Qasim was the Muslim soldier 
who conquered the territory of what is now Pakistan in the 
eighth century. 
by the government as preparation for a coup.45 Far 
from denying involvement, party representatives 
admit that, ‘It is no secret that Hizb ut-Tahrir has 
been involved in a number of failed coup attempts 
in the Middle East’.46  
In its recent literature, calls for the overthrow of 
‘corrupt Muslim leaders’ have intensified. The U.S. 
military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
lent increased radicalism to their rhetoric. In a 
recent article, an activist asserted:  
The time has come for a change. The time 
has come to remove the rulers plaguing the 
Muslim world, either directly through the 
masses or through the strongest elements… 
the people are ready, the rulers have failed, 
what is left is for a general in Syria or Egypt, 
Pakistan or Turkey to feel sufficiently 
agitated that he picks up the phone.47 
Thus while it seems clear that ideologically and 
practically Hizb ut-Tahrir cannot be classified as a 
terrorist group, it is willing to persuade militaries to 
overthrow their governments, and in certain cases 
be involved in such military coups itself. Should it 
ever come to power, its willingness to use violence 
as an Islamic state would be more certain: it 
consistently emphasises that the duty of the Islamic 
state is to carry out military campaigns to free 
Muslim lands from the rule of ‘unbelievers’ and to 
wage war against Israel.  
It is important to bear in mind that HT has never 
achieved any of its objectives, and its limited public 
support in much of the Islamic world means that it 
is unlikely to do so. Some suggest that this may 
lead to impatience among members as their goals 
seem as distant as they were when the party was 
founded more than a half century ago. This clearly 
has been a problem in the past: leaflets have urged 
members not to be impatient, and to be assured 




45 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, p. 167. 
46 ICG interview, Dr Imran Waheed, Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK) 
spokesperson, 5 June 2003. 
47 Jalaluddin Patel, ‘The Khilafah has been established (it 
now needs to be announced)’, Editorial, Khilafah (April 
2003) at www.khilafah.com. 
48 Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, ‘The Da’wah Carrier is not 
responsible for the achieving the results’, 20 July 2000. At 
www.khilafah.com. 
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C. INTERNATIONAL NETWORK 
The ideology stemming from an-Nabhani’s 
writings and from central figures in the leadership 
is one thing; the question of how far this ideology 
is accepted by local branches of the party is 
another. There is little information available on 
how monolithic the party is but the impression is of 
a central ideological base, with quite wide scope 
given to local leaders to carry on political activity 
in ways that suit local conditions. This seems to 
represent a shift, probably introduced in the early 
1980s, from the movement’s first years, when strict 
Leninist-like principles of party organisation were 
applied, and members were regularly expelled for 
divergence from the central party authority. How 
far this goes is not clear, but it seems unlikely that 
local branches can step beyond central elements of 
the ideology.  
1. Middle East 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s early activities took place mostly 
in Jordan, where it gained a following among 
Palestinians. Its activities were never fully 
legalised, although in 1964 a founding member, 
Ahmad Daour, won a seat in the parliament. In 
1968 he was among those arrested after the 
government accused Hizb ut-Tahrir of attempting a 
military coup, and from 1969 the position of the 
party was much more fragile, with membership 
usually resulting in a six-year jail sentence. 
Political liberalisation in Jordan in the 1990s gave 
the party more opportunity, but there was a further 
clampdown in 1993, when many members were 
arrested, and the authorities claimed they had 
discovered armed Hizb ut-Tahrir cells in the 
military department of Mu’ta University (an 
allegation ruled untrue in a subsequent court case). 
Nevertheless, the party continues to operate in 
Jordan, and there is some evidence that parts of the 
leadership are still resident there.  
For most of his life an-Nabhani lived in exile in 
Beirut, and the more tolerant regime in the city 
made it a base for many party activities. Despite the 
presence of Palestinians at the head of the 
movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir never gained serious 
influence in the Occupied Territories, where it 
could not compete with radical groups organising 
populist resistance, such as Hamas, or with the 
more nationalist elements represented by the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation.49 Although the 
party expresses something between sympathy and 
support, the intifada does not accord with its 
overarching ideology, which is that a jihad against 
Israel can only be launched in earnest once an 
Islamic state has been established.50 
The party was banned in Syria. Security forces 
carried out extensive arrests of members in 1999, 
which continued through 2002, although some 
activists were pardoned by President Bashar Asad. 
According to the Syrian Committee for Human 
Rights, 59 members remain in prison. 
In Iraq the party seems to have lost any significant 
operational capacity under the regime of Saddam 
Hussein; in 1990 members were executed after 
calling on Saddam to introduce an Islamic state.51 
After Saddam’s fall in 2003, however, the party 
announced the opening of a branch in Iraq, 
although what that means on the ground is unclear. 
So far, it seems, the coalition has placed no 
restrictions on its activities.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned in Egypt after being 
implicated in the putative 1974 coup52 and further 
arrests in 2002, apparently involving three British 
members of the party. The party was also banned in 
other North African countries. In Tunisia party 
cells were broken up in 1983, and arrests of 80 
members took place in 1991. In Libya attempts to 
influence Gaddafi’s policies were short-lived, and a 
number of activists were imprisoned, apparently 
after he was offended by their criticism of his 
ideology. One source suggests that the party was 
involved in attempted coups in Algeria and Sudan, 
 
 
49 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, op. cit., pp. 164-
165. 
50 Once established, such an Islamic state would have, 
according to Hizb ut-Tahrir theory, a duty to pursue jihad 
against the State of Israel and its destruction. It should also 
embrace modern military technology, including nuclear 
weapons. It is understandable, therefore, why Israeli 
sources consider Hizb ut-Tahrir a potential threat to 
national security. 
51 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, op. cit., p. 154. 
52 There is some confusion over Hizb ut-Tahrir’s actual role 
in the incident, which effectively ended when would-be 
revolutionaries were seized as they tried to take arms from 
a military academy in Cairo. See Ibid., p. 167, also Shereen 
Khairallah, “The Islamic Liberation Party: Search for a 
Lost Ideal”, Vision and Revision in Arab Society 1974, 
Cenam Reports (Beirut, 1975), pp. 87-95. 
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but there is no independent confirmation.53 In 
Turkey the party has been active but has faced 
repression by the state.  
The results of Hizb ut-Tahrir work in the Middle 
East have been largely negligible, although the 
party has influenced the debate among Islamists at 
the edges. Nevertheless, among well educated 
Muslims, it is seen as a heterodox group with an 
unacceptable interpretation of much of Islamic 
scripture. Hizb ut-Tahrir seems to have an 
advantage in societies where there is only limited 
religious knowledge among Muslims, where the 
state itself is overtly secular, such as those in 
Central Asia, or among Muslim communities in 
Western Europe. 
2. Western Europe 
According to the Hizb ut-Tahrir leader in Sweden, 
Fadi Abdullatif, the party is growing by actively 
recruiting second-generation Muslim immigrants.54 
Since members of this group did not themselves 
flee tyrannical states as many of their parents did, 
they are often more critical of democracy and the 
inequalities of capitalism and corrspondingly 
attracted to Hizb ut Tahrir’s message of a just 
Islamic order. Moreover, Muslim immigrants often 
face religious or ethnic discrimination. The party’s 
popularity among Muslims in the West has 
continued to grow, providing it a strong 
organisational, and possibly financial, base. 
Germany became the first Western state to ban 
Hizb ut-Tahrir in January 2003, citing its anti-
Semitic and anti-Israeli propaganda. However, the 
German authorities did not provide any evidence of 
links between it and terrorist groups. German 
security forces carried out further raids on known 
activists, now working illegally, in May 2003. 
In Denmark the party has also garnered support 
among immigrants. In March 2003 its leader, Fadi 
Abdullatif, was convicted of breaking anti-racism 
laws, after he handed out leaflets allegedly calling 
for Jews to be killed. The group claims the quotes 
were taken out of context. The government has 
apparently considered banning the party, which 
 
 
53 Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, op. cit., p. 154, 
citing Ihsan Abd al-Munim Samara. 
54 Video on Hizb ut-Tahrir produced in Sweden (2002). 
according to media reports has about 100 
members.55 
In the UK Hizb ut-Tahrir remains very active, 
particularly in London and in towns with major 
Muslim populations such as Birmingham, Bradford 
and Sheffield. It has been notably successful in 
recruiting students, although it has been banned 
from many university campuses, because of its 
anti-Semitism, alleged threatening behaviour 
towards students of other faiths, and public 
objections to homosexuality.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir developed a controversial UK 
reputation in the early 1990s that it has tried hard to 
live down. It grew quickly after the first Gulf war 
from a largely unknown organisation to perhaps the 
most notorious Islamist movement in Britain. Until 
January 1996, its leader in the UK was Omar Bakri 
Mohammed, a Syrian immigrant, whose 
inflammatory rhetoric made him a hate-figure in 
the British press, but a popular leader for some 
alienated and angry young Muslims.  
Media controversy over Bakri Mohammed’s 
apparent denial of the Holocaust and increasing 
tension on university campuses between Hizb ut-
Tahrir and Hindi and Jewish students led to Bakri 
Mohammed’s dismissal by the party’s international 
leadership in 1996.56 He went on to form Al-
Muhajiroun, a more overtly radical group, which 
has been charged with channelling young Muslims 
to groups providing military training in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere.57  
The present leaders of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK 
present a much more media-friendly, moderate 
message, and have been careful to play down any 
possible misinterpretation of their ideas. They are 
quick to deny allegations of anti-Semitism and 
condemn acts of violence, but the basic ideological 
message remains the same. 
 
 
55 Associated Press, “Muslim group spokesman gets 
suspended jail sentence for posting flyers urging Jews be 
killed”, 14 March 2003. 
56 Adam Lebor, A Heart Turned East: Among the Muslims 
of Europe and America (London, 1997), pp. 140-147.  
57 See Michael White, ‘Al-Muhajiroun: the portal for 
Britain’s suicide terrorists’, at www.ict.org.il/articles. 
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From its origins in the Middle East, and its following 
among Muslims in the West, Hizb ut-Tahrir has 
attempted to spread its network throughout the 
Muslim world. Among its targets have been non-Arab 
Muslim countries, among them the states of Central 
Asia, Muslim countries in the Far East, such as 
Indonesia, and south Asia, primarily Pakistan. Two 
states, Indonesia and Pakistan, offer a contrasting 
view of its potential for political success. 
Indonesia 
Hizb ut-Tahrir apparently first appeared in 
Indonesia in 1983, brought in by an Australian of 
Jordanian-Lebanese origin named Abdurrahman al-
Baghdadi. For the next fifteen years, it was mostly 
an underground movement on college campuses in 
Java. Its current spokesman, Ismail Yusanto, 
became attracted to the movement in 1985 when he 
was a geology student in the technical faculty of 
one of Indonesia's premier institutions, Gajah Mada 
University in Yogyakarta, Central Java. 
 
The movement is still largely campus-based, but it 
took off when political controls eased in the 
aftermath of Soeharto's fall in May 1998. It now 
claims "tens of thousands" of members, and 
publishes a host of publications including a glossy 
version of the party’s monthly bulletin, al-Wa'ie.58 
It has a particularly strong presence in Bogor, West 
Java, on the campus of the Bogor Agricultural 
Institute; in Yogyakarta, Central Java; in Jakarta; 
and Makassar, in South Sulawesi. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir has been able to mobilise thousands of 
demonstrators in support of Islamic law (for example, 
in separate marches in Jakarta and Kendari in 
Southeast Sulawesi in October 2002) and against the 
U.S. war with Iraq (Jakarta, January 2003). Its 
members have not been involved in violence, 
 
 
58 Articles include many on the importance of the caliphate; 
on the treachery of the House of Saud; on how the U.S. is 
accusing as a terrorist anyone who seeks to uphold Islamic 
law; on why separatism in Muslim countries is haram 
because the aim should be to unite, not divide, the ummah; 
and regular updates on the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
around the globe. It has a sophisticated website 
(http://www.al-islam.or.id) and apparently attracts some of 
its followers through the site. Al-Wa'ie also advertises 
upcoming meetings in different cities around Indonesia 
with lectures on such topics as "Overcoming Poverty 
through Shariah"; "Creating a Clean and Effective 
Government"; and "Shariah and Education Policy". 
although the party was represented at the founding 
congress of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the 
Indonesian Mujahidin Council) that included some 
members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the group accused 
of masterminding the bombing of Bali in October 
2002. It also was very prominent in the support group 
for Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the head of JI, at the opening 
of his trial in April 2003, joining forces again with 
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia.59 
Like its counterparts elsewhere, Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(Indonesia) is committed to the reestablishment of the 
Islamic caliphate. But many of its campaigns focus on 
shorter-term gains. A packed meeting ICG attended in 
late 2002 dealt with how to instil a new moral sense 
in primary schools, but the leadership has a decidedly 
international outlook, with particular concern about 
Western policies on Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
It is very much concerned with the persecution of its 
fellow members in Uzbekistan.  
Although Yusanto rejects Hizb ut-Tahrir 
participation in the political system as a party – 
indeed, rejects democracy as a political system – 
the group maintains good relations with those 
Muslim parties committed to the application of 
Sharia. For Hizb ut-Tahrir in Indonesia, the key 
means to achieving its goal seems to be 
recruitment: "Soeharto could be brought down with 
only 100,000 people, whereas in fact, Jakarta had 
11 million people at the time", says its leader. 
"When our membership reaches into the millions, 
we can talk about social and political change."60 
So far there have been no government restrictions 
on the party or any of its activities. It freely holds 
rallies and meetings, which are well attended. 
Together with the Jamaah Tarbiyah – considered an 
extension of the Ikhawanul Muslimin and which 
became the Justice Party, the HT is among the two 
most radical Islamic movements in the country. 
Pakistan 
Compared with its rapid growth in Indonesia, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir has enjoyed much less success in 
Pakistan, where its history is much shorter – the 
chapter was effectively launched in November 
2000. Although it claims there always were 
 
 
59 On the Jemaah Islamiyah, see ICG Asia Report No. 43, 
Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah 
Terrorist Network Operates, 11 December 2002.  
60 "Tidak Harus Hizbut Tahrir yang Mendirikan Khilafah", 
Suara Hidayatullah, Vol.15, No.6, October 2002, p. 25. 
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members in the country, the founders were mostly 
Pakistani expatriates.61  
As most of its branches are, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Pakistan) 
is small and secretive. It has a pyramid-like 
organisation, at the apex of which is the Emir of the 
Pakistani chapter, whose identity is not known. Only 
one member, the official spokesperson, Naveed Butt, 
has been allowed to reveal his office.62 
However, its need for public exposure has 
motivated Hizb ut-Tahrir to hold public rallies and 
demonstrations. As a result of these rallies, some 
members are aware of each other’s identities but 
most remain underground, forbidden by their 
leaders to participate in any public event. “We are 
not allowed to reveal our identity because of the 
world-wide repression against the Hizb ut-Tahrir”, 
claims Naveed Butt.63 
The insistence on establishment of an absolute 
Islamic state, where Sharia would be implemented in 
full and immediately, places Hizb ut-Tahrir apart 
from other Pakistani Islamic parties, such as the 
components of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal, which 
are willing to compromise on the establishment of an 
Islamic state in return for a share of political power.  
Thus far, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Pakistan) has used peaceful 
means to spread its message. These include 
pamphlets, conferences, seminars, and daroos 
(religious lectures). Members also propagate its 
ideology individually, working mostly in urban 
centres. The party mainly targets the educated urban 
middle class, ignoring rural areas that are considered 
of little use to its political objectives. More 
specifically, it focuses on “opinion-makers” such as 
journalists, teachers, lawyers, trade unionists and 
 
 
61 The events of 11 September 2001 have helped Hizb ut-
Tahrir to expand its base somewhat, mainly within urban 
centres and among middle class youth. Since then the 
environment in the West is perceived by Pakistani orthodox 
Muslims as less sympathetic to religious, in particular 
Islamic, sensitivities, and some expatriate Pakistanis have 
returned home. Some were members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir 
in their adopted countries. It is this influx that has helped 
encouraged the party to acquire at least a limited presence 
in Pakistan. Typical of these members is the official 
spokesperson, Naveed Butt, who is an electrical engineer 
educated at Chicago University. 
62 ICG interviews with members of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
(Pakistan), Islamabad, 8 April 2003. 
63 ICG interview, Naveed Butt, Islamabad, 11 April 2003. 
religious scholars, whom it believes are capable of 
influencing the public at large. 
According to some Hizb ut-Tahrir members, the 
party’s relationship with the Musharraf government 
was cordial at first. It was apparently encouraged by 
some intelligence agencies to set up an office after it 
decided to establish a public presence in Pakistan.64 
However, the police sealed the office on 26 October 
2001 after the first public demonstration. After 
several public rallies, the police arrested a number of 
members, all of whom have subsequently been 
released. However, the government has not formally 
banned Hizb ut-Tahrir and might not feel the need for 
more drastic action because it has clearly failed to 
make any substantial inroads.  
According to the journalist Ahmed Rashid, who has 
studied the movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir has had very 
little impact in Pakistan for two reasons. First, in 
Central Asia, it has benefited from the absence of 
competition. In Pakistan, it competes with several 
well-established parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami 
for the same target audience, the educated classes. 
Secondly, because of a substantial and assertive Shia 
minority, Pakistani Islam is sectarian in nature, a 
phenomenon that does not exist in Central Asia. Since 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (Pakistan) is “not sectarian in its 
outlook, it is unlikely to succeed here”.65 
Perhaps most significantly, though, Hizb ut-Tahrir 
lacks appeal for the Pakistani military, whose 
support and patronage had helped parties such as 
the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema Islam to 
establish and expand their political base. With its 
one-point pan-Islamic agenda, Hizb ut-Tahrir has 
little to offer the military. On the contrary, its goal 
of a Caliphate, and hence opposition to military 
rule, has isolated it from potential religious allies 
and deprived it of military patronage. It seems 




64 ICG interviews with Hizb ut-Tahrir (Pakistan) members, 
Islamabad, 7 April 2003. 
65 ICG interview, 4 March 2003. Previous accusations that 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is fiercely anti-Shia do not have much 
justification in the party literature. It claims to recognise all 
branches of Islam. See Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK), “The 
Inaccuracies of the Book ‘Jihad – the rise of militant Islam 
in Central Asia’ by Ahmed Rashid”. A more telling source 
is the anti-Hizb ut-Tahrir website run by radical neo-
Wahhabis, where one of the main accusations against the 
party is that it accepts Shias. See www.htexposed.com. 
Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 
ICG Asia Report N°58, 30 June 2003 Page 14 
 
 
III. HIZB UT-TAHRIR IN CENTRAL 
ASIA 
The differing experiences of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
globally underline its dual image: it gains strength 
from having a centralised ideological base, which 
also provides some organisational support, but 
much local success comes from local leaders’ 
response to particular conditions. In Central Asia 
the party has maintained a balancing act between its 
central ideology and its need to respond to local 
concerns to gain support. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir grew out of the fractured landscape 
of Islam in Central Asia that emerged after Soviet 
controls on religion and politics were weakened in 
the late 1980s. Interest in political Islam was first 
awakened by movements such as the Islamic 
Renaissance Party in Tajikistan, and by a range of 
groups inspired by Saudi Wahhabi teachings in 
Uzbekistan, members of which later formed the 
militant Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 
an ally of the Afghan Taliban. 66 
The repression of these groups by governments, 
particularly in Uzbekistan, ensured that little 
religious plurality emerged. Instead, the way was 
prepared for more conspiratorial groups, an ideal 
environment for Hizb ut-Tahrir. Reports of its 
activity first emerged in Uzbekistan in the mid-
1990s. Initial growth there seems to have spilled 
over into southern Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the 
wake of the mass repression of members after 
1997. In 1998 Uzbek members apparently 
supported the establishment of a branch in 
Tajikistan, which flourished over the next several 
years. Since 2000, reports of activities in southern 
Kazakhstan have appeared as well. There have also 




66 From bases in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, in August 
1999 and August 2000, the IMU waged two unsuccessful 
military incursions into southern Kyrgyzstan, en route to 
Uzbekistan. Since the U.S. military action against the 
Taliban, however, IMU forces appear to have been largely 
destroyed or scattered. In December 2001, reports 
suggested that its leader, Namangani, had been killed in 
Afghanistan, and his followers had fled to Pakistan or had 
split into small groups inside Afghanistan. For more detail 
on the IMU, see ICG Asia Briefing, The IMU and the Hizb 
ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign, 30 
January 2002.  
During 2002 many observers sensed a decline in 
Hizb ut-Tahrir activity – fewer leaflets appeared, 
and some researchers claimed that the reason was a 
fall-off in financing, perhaps caused by restrictions 
introduced after the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the U.S. But the war in Afghanistan and 
the military action in Iraq also seem to have 
contributed to a radicalisation of views of some 
members, and a sharper tone in the party’s 
publications.  
A. WHY PEOPLE JOIN 
Members give many reasons for joining Hizb ut-
Tahrir related to the environment they live in, 
personal histories and government policies. There 
is no single issue but there is often a psychological 
response related to loss of social status, lack of 
belief in the future, and a desire to ‘do something’ 
about changes in society that deeply affect people’s 
lives. 
Socio-economic circumstances are relevant for 
many who join but to point to poverty as the main 
driver in recruitment is rather simplistic. One Hizb 
ut-Tahrir leader says: “The idea that poverty is 
what drives people to join is a myth. Look at how 
many well educated Muslims in the West are 
members. There are other reasons for radicalisation 
than poverty”.67  
This assertion may be true of the West, but socio-
economic factors clearly play a role in Central 
Asia, where the struggle for daily financial survival 
is uppermost in most people’s minds. Some 
members seem to expect financial reward. 
Nevertheless, although many do point to the 
economic problems they face when explaining why 
they joined, there is a certain sense of creating 
victimhood in what they say.  
When asked why people join, one member replied: 
“Look we live in poverty, this is not a normal life”. 
His wife intervened: “What are you talking about? 
We are building an extension. We’re going to buy 




67 ICG interview, Dr Imran Waheed, spokesperson Hizb ut-
Tahrir (UK), 5 June 2003, London. 
68 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
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Many members are, of course, truly poor, but more 
important is this wider sense of receiving a bad deal 
from society and the state. Their own aspirations 
have somehow been blocked, and the social change 
they see around them is disconcerting and often 
threatens their place in society or the family. 
Many in Central Asia believe that members join 
Hizb ut-Tahrir because they are paid. A wife of a 
member says, “Only the young unemployed join 
up. They go because of the money…”69 Some 
analysts report that members are paid U.S.$50-
$100 for giving out leaflets, but there is no hard 
evidence of this. Members all deny they receive 
any payment for their work: “We only get money 
when we sell literature, then we take money and 
pass it on [to the leadership], and when we collect 
members’ fees – we also pass it on. But otherwise 
there is no other money at all…”70 Court reports 
from Tajikistan, however, suggested that leaders 
did receive money, some of which was passed on to 
junior members, but most of which was spent on 
party activities.71 
Even if there is some payment to members, it 
seems unlikely that many are involved purely 
because of financial benefits. It is hard not to agree 
with a Hizb ut-Tahrir member interviewed in 
Uzbekistan:  
Somebody who knows me accused me of 
doing this all for money. So I said to him, ‘if 
I give you U.S.$100 will you go and give out 
these leaflets in the bazaar?’ He was shocked, 
and refused, of course. Nobody would do this 
just for money, knowing they could get 
twenty years in prison or worse as a result.72 
More important than poverty and the possibility of 
earning money are a number of psychological 
issues. A main reason seems to be the lack of 
anything else to do, and the sheer pointlessness of 
many young men’s lives. One member explained 
how he got involved: 
Time used to simply drag by for us. We sat 
on the street. And they [Hizb ut-Tahrir] were 
doing something. We started to talk to them, 
 
 
69 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
70 ICG interview, Osh, February 2003. 
71 Court protocol No. 73, Sughd provincial court, 28 March 2003. 
72 ICG interview, Margilan, March 2003. 
my friends joined them, and I joined up as 
well. …73 
This lack of a perspective for the future is a 
common theme among many young members. 
Those who recall the Soviet Union remember the 
certainty and stability that the system provided, and 
contrast it with today’s insecure world. Young men 
who perceive that their way in life is blocked by 
‘the system’, by corrupt authorities or by other 
obstacles are particularly vulnerable to Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s simple explanations of why they have not 
achieved success. 
This blocking of ambition probably explains why a 
number of educated, apparently successful people 
join. Their thwarted aspirations encourage them to 
blame the system, and the system itself, with its 
self-centred corruption, nepotism, and lack of 
apparent concern for the greater good, encourages 
politicisation of essentially personal problems. 
This is a reflection of systemic political and 
economic problems in Central Asian states that will 
not be overcome overnight. But many policies are 
simply short-sighted. Uzbekistan’s increasingly 
restrictive border regime – making cross-border 
trade all but impossible – has left many traders out 
of work and deeply discontented. Given that many 
Hizb ut-Tahrir members are already involved in 
private trade, it seems likely that such moves can 
only increase the party’s potential support base.74 
The issue of borders is interesting given Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s call for a borderless and nationless Islamic 
state. For many Uzbek minorities outside the 
Uzbek state especially, such a vision is attractive, 
reflecting deep discontent with their post-Soviet 
status, cut off from compatriots by new and 
increasingly closed frontiers. 
The political solution offered – the wise rule of a 
just Caliph – seems particularly appropriate for 
Uzbek political culture, in which researchers have 
noted an aspiration for a father-figure ruler whose 
personal qualities (such as just and fair) are more 
 
 
73 ICG interview, Osh, March 2003. 
74 Some Uzbek officials assert that the border closures will 
serve to limit cross-border traffic in illegal literature and 
funding for Hizb ut-Tahrir. Given the illegal contraband 
networks that the closures have established, it seems 
unlikely to have any effect at all. 
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important than any political ideology.75 Hizb ut-
Tahrir offers a polity with the politics removed, an 
order in which most rules are already preordained, 
and an authority figure who would judge on the 
basis of god-given rules. 
These essentially psychological reasons for joining 
are also very pertinent in southern Kyrgyzstan, 
where the political role of Hizb ut-Tahrir is less 
relevant in relation to the relatively liberal 
government. Nevertheless, in both Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan increasingly authoritarian governments 
have also become the target of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
propaganda. Its willingness to address issues that 
are taboo in the mass media, such as high-level 
corruption, and the frequent lack of a viable 
political alternative, clearly helps attract a certain 
element of angry young men. 
In Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir has a particularly 
strong role as the only serious political opposition 
to an overwhelmingly repressive government.76 No 
secular opposition parties are legal in an 
environment of widespread dislike of the regime. 
Inevitably, a certain part of the sympathy if not 
support for Hizb ut-Tahrir comes from those who 
primarily are politically opposed to the authorities 
rather than particularly supportive of the party’s 
final goals. ICG has frequently interviewed young 
people who have expressed support for Islamism 
out of distaste for the government, not because of 
any particular desire for an Islamic state. 
The problems thrown up by continuing social 
change also provide a ready audience for many 
Hizb ut-Tahrir messages. Its strictures on women 
find support among some men, many of whom find 
that the huge social upheavals of the past decade 
have undermined their status. Poverty has forced 
many young women into prostitution; this fact 
alone was raised by almost every Hizb ut-Tahrir 
member ICG interviewed. Pandering to the 
conservative views of the average Uzbek young 
man, the party provides a political and theological 
 
 
75 See the interesting work by Morgan Y. Liu on ethnic 
Uzbeks in Osh province, inter alia, “Recognising the Khan, 
Authority, Space and Political Imagination among Uzbek 
Men in Post-Soviet Osh, Kyrgyzstan” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Michigan, 2002). 
76 See ICG Asia Report No 46, Uzbekistan’s Reform 
Program: Illusion or Reality, 18 February 2003 for 
information on political, religious and economic repression 
in Uzbekistan. 
justification for reasserting male supremacy in 
society.77 Personal and social inadequacy is 
explained by reference to wider political and social 
changes forced on society by rulers following 
orders from the West.  
Government repression clearly has some impact 
both in dissuading potential members and attracting 
others. One member in Uzbekistan explained that 
he had never really been interested in Hizb ut-
Tahrir until his brother was arrested for 
membership. Then he, too, joined, disgusted with 
the way the police treated him. He was later 
arrested, but released under an amnesty.78 Many 
women have become involved because their 
husbands or sons have been arrested, and wider 
community sympathy has been generated because 
of extensive kinship ties in traditional Uzbek 
families. 
Few people interviewed suggested that Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s literature persuaded them to join by 
making an overwhelming intellectual case but it 
clearly has an impact on some. One member 
explained that the party’s ‘scientific’ explanations 
of religious questions attracted him: 
I come from a secular home, but I got 
interested in religion. But nobody could 
answer my questions, about how the world 
was created or things like that. My 
grandfather was religious but he would just 
say: ‘God created it’. But he couldn’t explain 
why the science we learned in school said 
something different. Hizb ut-Tahrir helped 
me understand what science said and 
answered my questions in a language I 
understood.79 
The party’s modern language is more attractive to 
these young, secularised men than the complex 
religious formulas of the more traditional mullahs. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is much less demanding in terms of 
 
 
77 Local attitudes are often more conservative than Hizb ut-
Tahrir ideology would allow. In Tajikistan members 
refused to be judged in a court presided over by a woman, 
although party ideology permits women to be judges. ICG 
interview with judge of the city court of Khujand 
Mavdjuda Sharipova, Khudjand, January 2003; ICG 
interview with Dr Imran Waheed, Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK) 
spokesperson, London, 5 June 2003.  
78 ICG interview, Ferghana province, April 2003. 
79 ICG interview, Ferghana province, March 2003. 
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religious knowledge than other Islamic sects: there 
is no need to learn Arabic or study deeply the many 
books of religious scholars. All that a member 
needs to know is already distilled in a short list of 
books and pamphlets written in easy to understand 
contemporary idiom. 
As the above examples make evident, there is no 
easy answer as to why people join. Most of the 
attraction for young men in Central Asia can be 
found in a complex mixture of motives: 
psychological, political and social. The desire to be 
part of a close-knit group, which provides mutual 
support, psychological and perhaps financial, also 
plays its part, and fits well with traditional Uzbek 
social patterns, in which men often form close 
groups – whether linked by kinship or not – that 
meet regularly for meals or other social events. 
The search for an element of certainty in a 
changing society, at both the micro-level (the 
group) and the macro-level (belief in a future order) 
is an important element in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s 
attraction. The simplicity of the order and its 
ideology resembles that of many religious sects, 
and the psychological profile of the average 
member is perhaps closer to that of a fringe 
religious sect than of a radical political party.  
B. EXTENT OF SUPPORT 
Media reports sometimes claim that Hizb ut-Tahrir 
has as many as 100,000 adherents in Central Asia.80 
By any reckoning, this seems an exaggeration. 
Exaggerating the support is useful for both security 
services (keen to increase budgets and influence) 
and Hizb ut-Tahrir. In reality, numbers are 
probably much smaller than either would admit, 
although still significant. 
 In Uzbekistan, at least 4,000 Hizb ut-Tahrir 
members are in prison, and most observers suggest 
that they represent a significant percentage of the 
membership. According to one source, in February 
1999 Zukhriddin Husniddinov, now presidential 
adviser on religious issues and a former National 
Security Service (NSS) officer, claimed at a closed 
conference that there were 6,500 to 7,000 members 
 
 
80 Hizb ut-Tahrir spokespersons themselves claim not to 
know how many adherents they have in Central Asia. ICG 
interview, Dr Imram Waheed, 5 June, London. 
in Uzbekistan.81 In the absence of more reliable 
statistics, this seems realistic, although possibly 
slightly deflated for internal purposes. It seems 
likely there has been some growth since 1999, but 
it is impossible to quantify this even approximately. 
A well-informed scholar in Tashkent has suggested 
that figures of up to 15,000 are possible in 2003.82  
In Kyrgyzstan security sources claim that 
membership is about 1,000 to 1,200. Others claim 
that it is much bigger but figures between 1,000 
and 2,000 receive the most support. A senior 
security officer said, “They pretend that there are 
many of them to receive financing. But there is not 
really much serious activity here”.83 In late 2002 
police held files on more than 600 people in Osh 
and about 680 in the Jalalabad region whom they 
consider members or sympathisers.84 There may, of 
course, be members who are not known but the 
police claim otherwise. Outside these southern 
regions Hizb ut-Tahrir has only limited support, 
although there are occasional reports of activity in 
the north.  
It is difficult to get any reliable membership figures 
for Tajikistan, but arrests in 2000, when there was a 
mass campaign against the party, suggest that the 
figure is in the low rather than high thousands. 
Court proceedings against alleged Hizb ut-Tahrir 
leaders in March 2002 suggested that they had 
recruited more than 1,000 members.85 In 
Kazakhstan, observers estimate membership in the 
low hundreds, and maybe only dozens. 
It is hard to imagine that there are more than 20,000 
members in the whole of Central Asia. Considering 
the political conditions under which they work, and 
 
 
81 ICG interview, Islamic specialist, Tashkent, May 2003. 
82 ICG interview, May 2003. 
83 ICG interview, Jalal-Abad, March 2003. 
84 ICG interviews, Osh, Jalalabad, December 2002. These 
police registers [profilakticheskii uchet] are widely used by 
Central Asian police forces, as a way of monitoring 
‘unreliable’ citizens. There is always some doubt over the 
validity of police figures. One Kyrgyz security official 
admits that technical problems create obstacles: ‘We don’t 
have computers, we can’t create our own network, [to 
establish] how many, and who has been arrested. [If] we 
could do lists of names in each region, we would know 
what the dynamic was…’ ICG interview, Bishkek, 
December 2002. 
85Court protocol No. 73, Sughd provincial court, 28 March 
2003. 
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the difficulty of creating any political party in 
Central Asia’s societies, this is still a significant 
figure, but far below some estimates.  
C. WHO THEY ARE 
1. Regions and ethnicity 
The majority – though by no means all – of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir members appear to be from the Ferghana 
Valley region (including the Andijan, Ferghana, 
and Namangan provinces of Uzbekistan; the Sughd 
province of Tajikistan, and the Osh and Jalal-Abad 
provinces of Kyrgyzstan). The concentration of 
arrests and the state crackdown in these areas have 
intensified resentment among this population, 
which had already felt oppressed and largely 
excluded from power by the post-Soviet Central 
Asian regimes.86 Southern Kazakhstan has also 
witnessed a rise in reported activity that is partly 
among the indigenous ethnic Uzbek minority and 
some Kazakhs, but is probably also bolstered by 
Uzbeks from Uzbekistan who have crossed into the 
relative safety of Kazakhstan. 
Within Uzbekistan the overwhelming proportion of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir activity seems to be in the Ferghana 
Valley and Tashkent. A partial analysis of those 
arrested between 1997 and 2001 shows that 23 per 
cent were from Andijan province, and 35.2 per cent 
from Tashkent city. Much lower numbers were 
from the other provinces of the Ferghana Valley – 
Ferghana itself, and Namangan province. The 
western Karakalpakstan and Navoi provinces had 
no representatives in the sample.87 
 
 
86 Kathleen Collins, ‘Clans, Pacts, and Politics: Regime 
Transition in Post-Soviet Central Asia’, Journal of 
Democracy 13, no. 3 (July 2002). 
87 The figures are calculated on the basis of arrest records 
gathered by the Memorial human rights organisation, based 
in Moscow. They cover 1,072 members of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
arrested between December 1997 and August 2001. This 
probably represents less than one-quarter of those arrested 
during this period. There are a number of caveats to these 
figures: many members may not show up as such in the 
statistics; they may depend on the efforts of the police in 
different regions; police may have concentrated efforts on 
younger, poorer members; the statistics themselves are 
gathered from a number of sources, not all of which may be 
completely reliable; and of course they represent only a 
limited sample of the total arrested, let alone of the total 
membership. 
In Tajikistan the main centre has been the Sughd 
province in the north, and particularly the town of 
Khudjand and neighbouring districts. There are also 
increasing reports of activities in Dushanbe, and 
some in southern towns such as Kulob. But these 
are generally thought to be the work of small 
groups or individuals, rather than representing a 
major change in the geographical profile of the 
group.88 
In Kyrgyzstan the centre of activity remains two 
southern provinces: Osh and Jalal-Abad. The 
southern Batken region has witnessed much less 
activity, probably because it has a much smaller 
ethnic Uzbek population. Mass migration of 
southerners to Bishkek suggests there might be 
some scope for growth in the north, and there are 
reports of activities in Bishkek, Tokmok and Issyk-
kul. However, Hizb ut-Tahrir membership remains 
overwhelmingly ethnic Uzbek, while southerners 
who migrate to the north tend to be ethnic Kyrgyz. 
Whether the party’s ideology will prove attractive 
for them remains doubtful. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir has attempted to expand its ethnic 
base. This seems to have met with only limited 
success, although leaflets are published in both 
Kyrgyz and Tajik. In Tajikistan many alleged 
leaders tried in March 2002 were ethnic Tajiks, but 
court records suggest that most members were 
ethnic Uzbeks.89  
In Kyrgyzstan security sources claim that the 
membership consists is up to 90 per cent ethnic 
Uzbek, 3 to 4 per cent ethnic Kyrgyz and 4 to 5 per 
cent ethnic Uigurs.90 Interviews with members and 
police officers suggest that these figures are 
probably fairly accurate. 
2. Membership profile 
‘Alisher’ is 30, wears a fairly snappy suit and tie, 
and has a car and a mobile phone. He seemed to 
find the surroundings in which he talked with ICG, 
a dilapidated house in Ferghana province, slightly 
unsettling, as if he was used to more luxury. He 
looked like a prospering small businessman but he 




88 ICG interviews, local officials, Dushanbe, Kulob, 
May/June 2003. 
89 ICG interviews, Dushanbe, April 2003. 
90 ICG interview, senior NSS officer, Kyrgyzstan. 
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Although the majority of members still come from 
the unemployed, there is a strong element of what 
might be called the ‘educated lower middle class’ 
in the movement, particularly among the 
leadership. Many have been involved in private 
trade in some way, and some clearly have 
reasonable financial backing. Many come from 
fairly secular backgrounds and have few of the 
external elements of puritanism associated with 
Wahhabis, such as beards or not smoking. 
It seems likely that much of the early leadership of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia was well educated. 
Farhad Usmanov, who was killed by police in 
1999, was among the early leaders, and came from 
a well-known religious family in Tashkent. Among 
those arrested was prominent Uzbek writer Emin 
Osman, who was detained in February 2001 and 
died a month later, apparently after being tortured.91  
But assertions that Hizb ut-Tahrir is a movement of 
intellectuals are far from the truth. The majority 
who join are poor, badly educated, and 
unemployed, particularly in Kyrgyzstan. A police 
officer in Kara-Su who knows them well says: 
“They work in cafes, hairdressers, shoe repair 
shops, or trade at the bazaar”.92 Security services in 
southern Kyrgyzstan claim that 90 per cent of 
members are unemployed, 90 per cent do not have 
higher or middle specialised education, and more 
than 60 per cent come from poor backgrounds. 
Most are young, with some 70 per cent in the 18-30 
age group, 25 per cent aged 30-40, and only about 
5 per cent over 40.93  
In Uzbekistan the party seems initially to have had 
a more educated base, possibly because much of 
the leadership was originally based there. Some 16 
per cent of a sample of those arrested had higher 
education, while only 6 per cent had not finished 
high school. Nevertheless, 56 per cent were 
unemployed, while 8 per cent were businessmen, 
followed by collective farm workers (5 per cent), 
teachers (4 per cent) and students (4 per cent). 
Since many unemployed in Uzbekistan actually are 
well educated, these figures may be somewhat 
misleading. Age-wise the figures mirror those of 
other countries. Although ages ranged from 15 to 
 
 
91 BBC report, 10 March 2001. 
92 ICG interview, police officer, Karasu, Osh Province, 
April 2003. 
93 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
60, 82 per cent of those arrested were between 21 
and 36 in 2000.94 
This is only a rough snapshot of Hizb ut-Tahrir but 
it shows that members are relatively representative 
of many groups in the wider population, on average 
slightly better educated, but more likely to be 
unemployed than otherwise. The leadership seems 
to have come from fairly good background, well 
educated, and with some financial support, but the 
mass membership still relies heavily on the 
unemployed, small traders, and artisans. 
In Tajikistan Hizb ut-Tahrir adherents have 
overwhelmingly come from Sughd (formerly 
Leninabad) province, its most industrial, literate, 
and secular region. A judge said: “Many are from 
good families – there’s no material interest there, 
just ideological”.95 Nevertheless, again the mass of 
members are unemployed youth, although there are 
also a fair number of students. Of the 118 Hizb ut-
Tahrir members who were detained in 2000 by 
security services in Sughd province, 64 per cent 
were between 21 and 30, 72 per cent were 
unemployed, 11 per cent were students, 2 per cent 
teachers and 1 per cent Muslim clergy.96 
Most interesting, and potentially worrying, is that 
critics and sympathisers alike note that even 
Central Asians with little or no religious training or 
upbringing have become avid Hizb ut-Tahrir 
followers. Indeed, it is not the traditional religious 
conservatives who support the party, but for the 
most part youths with little knowledge of Islam, 




94 Original figures from Human Rights Organisation 
‘Memorial’ The breakdown of employment is for a 
subsample of 739 for which such information is available. 
Education information was available for 754 people. 
95 ICG interview with judge of the city court of Khujand 
Mavdjuda Sharipova, Khudjand, January 2003. 
96 ICG interview, Dust Dustov, Head of the Sector on 
Interethnic Relations, Hukumat, Sughd province, 
Khudjand, 2003. These statistics probably underestimate 
the level of education of Hizb ut-Tahrir members. First, 
better educated members are more likely to have relatives 
who will pay for their release or protect them in some way. 
Secondly, the better educated are probably among the 
leaders and less likely to get arrested while distributing 
leaflets or engaging in similar public actions. 
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The reason Hizb ut-Tahrir is attractive to Muslims 
from relatively secular backgrounds is probably its 
somewhat modern image and ability to speak their 
language. Whereas the traditional imam might 
quote parts of the Q’uran (often in Arabic), and 
provide rather ritualistic answers to secular 
questions, Hizb ut-Tahrir is much better able to 
respond in a way that reflects the world view with 
which these young people were brought up.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir remains an overwhelmingly male 
organisation. It does openly call for women to 
become members but they seem still a very small 
percentage, perhaps 6 or 7 per cent in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, according to security sources. Most are 
relatives – wives or mothers – of male members. It 
is not clear whether they take part in distributing 
leaflets: some members say they do, others deny it. 
Women have become active in Uzbekistan, but 
mainly in staging demonstrations in defence of 
imprisoned relatives.  
D. PARTY STRUCTURE  
Penetrating Hizb ut-Tahrir’s structure is difficult. 
Interviewees refuse to answer questions on 
‘organisational issues’, and often do not understand 
the structure themselves. Nevertheless, what can be 
gleaned from researchers and security services 
suggests that the organisational structure is 
identical across the region, at least in theory. It 
relies on a cell structure akin to early Communist 
organisations, with strict internal discipline to avoid 
infiltration and maintain ideological purity. 
At the lowest level members are organised in daira 
or halka (cells), normally of five members. The 
head of each cell – the mushrif – directs its 
members. At the district level or at the head of a 
large mahalla, or local neighbourhood committee 
(assuming there are several cells), the leader is 
termed a Musa’id, who organises activities through 
several assistants (Nakib). The regional 
representative (Mu’tamad) is appointed by the 
central political council (Kiiadat), of the 
international party, headed by the overall Amir of 
the party (since May 2003 the Palestinian, Ata 
Abu-l-Rushta).  
On the basis of scant evidence, links between the 
international party and the local branches seem to 
be sporadic and ad hoc, rather than regularly 
organised. There is clearly some scope for local 
branches to write their own leaflets, and make their 
own tactical decisions – when to distribute leaflets, 
and where, for example. Some of these members 
take the texts of leaflets off the website themselves 
and translate them on their own initiative. 
Ideological shifts, though, seem unlikely to come 
from below: moving far from the party’s central 
ideology is likely to lead to expulsion.  
At the local level, individual members usually 
create new cells by recruiting heavily from existing 
informal social networks, such as kinship and clan. 
They also use the close ties of the Uzbek minorities 
(in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) to expand the party 
in maximally safe ways.  
The cell’s leader is the only person who has access 
to the next cell in the organisation’s structure. The 
result is a hierarchical or pyramid-like structure that 
is very decentralised. Members know few other 
members and so can betray little information about 
the organisation.  
The leadership has seemingly remained elusive in 
some areas, with security services apparently able 
to penetrate only to the regional level. But a good 
part of the leadership is believed to have been 
arrested in Uzbekistan, and possibly in Tajikistan, 
while in Kyrgyzstan the police claim to have it 
under close observation. “Leaders? We know them 
all”, claims one Kyrgyz police officer, rather 
unconvincingly.97  
Initially it seems likely that the Uzbek, Tajik and 
Kyrgyz sections of the party were part of one 
entity, based in Uzbekistan. There is certainly 
evidence that the Tajik branch was initiated and led 
from Tashkent.98 There seems to be only limited 
cross-border links among members at the lower and 
middle level, although probably there is some 
cross-border traffic in books, leaflets, and money. 
Few members have much information on what is 
going on in other countries however, suggesting 
that any ‘Central Asian network’ is limited to the 




97 ICG interview, Osh, February 2003. 
98 Court protocol No. 73, Sughd provincial court, 28 March 
2003. The accusation claims that Tajik leaders of the 
organisation were subordinate to a certain ‘Alisher’, based 
in Tashkent, who appointed the leadership and arranged for 
delivery of literature and funding. This is of course court 
evidence and therefore not above suspicion. 
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It is not clear where leaflets are printed. In 
November 2002 Kyrgyz police seized a car 
carrying 5,000 leaflets, allegedly being delivered 
from Uzbekistan.99 Most researchers tend to 
believe, however, that leaflets flow in the other 
direction, from the more open atmosphere of Osh 
and Jalal-Abad, into Uzbekistan.100 Initially, 
literature seems to have gone from Uzbekistan into 
Tajikistan, but Tajik police claimed in 2002 to have 
discovered a small printing press used by the party, 
suggesting that production is localised where 
possible.101 
Internal discipline is vital for this kind of party 
structure, and there is a range of punishments for 
members who break the rules, up to and including 
expulsion. ‘If you commit haram (act forbidden by 
Islam) three times, then the members do not speak 
to you, won’t meet you for three or six months’, a 
member said. ‘Although if you have some 
problems in that time, they’ll come and help 
you’.102 Others suggest that punishments for 
offences not warranting expulsion include buying 
flour for the poor, or observing fasts.103  
Most operations are conducted in top-down 
fashion, with individual cells awaiting instructions 
before acting. However, it seems there is some 
scope for independent actions at the cell level. A 
member in Karasu admitted that in 2001 he and his 
fellow members had gone to the election booths 
and written on the bulletins “We will vote only for 
a Caliphate”.104 According to him: “We decided this 
ourselves, our group, but there was no command 
from above…”105 Nevertheless, other members 
have apparently had similar ideas. One in Aravan 
said: “At the elections we vote against everybody; 
 
 
99 Kabar news agency, “Khalifat zhiv, V Kyrgyzskom Oshe 
perekhvacheni 5 tys. Listovok “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, 
pribyvshykh iz Uzbkistana” [the Caliphate is alive, In 
Kyrgyz Osh 5,000 leaflets of Hizb ut-Tahrir have been 
seized, arriving from Uzbekistan], 12 November 2002.  
100 ICG interview, B. Babadjanov, Tashkent, May 2003.  
101Alexei Igushev, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir remains active in 
Central Asia’, Eurasianet Insight, 2 April 2003, 
www.eurasianet.org. 
102 ICG interview, Osh, February 2003. 
103 ICG interview, police officer, Karasu, Osh province, 
February, March 2003. 
104 ICG interview, Karasu, January 2003. 
105 ICG interviews, Hizb ut-Tahrir members, Osh, February 
2003. 
at the referendum our boys wrote: “We want a 
caliphate”’.106 
Not all those involved in Hizb ut-Tahrir activities 
are necessarily full members. A muyayit is 
considered a sympathiser, but not an active 
member. According to a member:  
a muyayit can agitate [on our behalf], but 
cannot explain everything. They speak to 
people, and then bring them to us. Or we can 
have lessons at a muyayit’s house, if for 
example, its impossible to do it at my place. 
They give us money. And generally help us, 
sometimes they give out leaflets for us…107 
These structures necessarily limit the extent to 
which Hizb ut-Tahrir can develop into a mass 
movement. But that is not necessarily its aim – it is 
effectively a small, elite vanguard designed to 
move Islamic societies towards an Islamic state. In 
the circumstances of Central Asia, the number of 
members may not be the most vital element. One 
activist said:  
We don’t call on people to join Hizb now, we 
explain to people what the Koran says, what 
we should do. It is not compulsory to be a 
member of Hizb, some aren’t Hizb members, 
but all know Hizb ideas…. Not every Muslim 
should become a member of Hizb. But he 
should do as Allah orders. …there are 
enough members of Hizb already.108 
All this organisation and printing of leaflets costs 
money, although probably not huge amounts. There 
is little information, however, on how the 
organisation is financed. The Kyrgyz security 
services know little but suspect that much financing 
is internal: from membership fees, though some 
money comes from outside. “It would be an 
exaggeration to say they received financing from 
international terrorist organisations”, said one 
senior officer. Some suggest they have received 
financing from local businessmen, but there is no 
direct evidence to support this.109 Another senior 
 
 
106 ICG interview, January 2003. 
107 ICG interview, Hizb ut-Tahrir members, Osh, February 
2003. 
108 ICG interview, Karasu, January 2003. 
109 An internet article [D. Khudjviri, ‘Ostrovok demokratii 
prevrashchaetsya v … ostrovok ekstremizma’, 
www.centrasia.ru, 2 December 2002] accused Bayaman 
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officer claimed: “They seek sponsorship from local 
businessmen, and their leadership receives money. 
But they hide that from ordinary members, they 
may report that they spent money on recruitment, 
but the money stays in their pockets…”110 
Some have suggested that Hizb ut-Tahrir is linked 
to criminal groups. In Tajikistan police officers 
claim that they are involved in criminal activities, 
including drugs and arms sales, and have been 
involved in racketeering.111 There is little evidence 
for any of this, and most ordinary members seem a 
long way from this type of criminality, although 
some young people in Uzbekistan suggest that HT 
is becoming an alternative mafia at some bazaars. 
No Hizb ut-Tahrir activities – essentially limited to 
distributing poor-quality leaflets and books – 
require massive financing. It is plausible, therefore, 
that a good proportion can be funded from the 
membership fees paid by those who work. 
Additional ad hoc payments from the international 
organisation are probably vital in the initial stages. 
It is also not clear how the transnational party is 
funded, although Muslim leaders in Britain have 
suggested that it has sources in the Gulf.112  
Given the widespread illegal money-laundering and 
capital transfers that occur in Central Asia, it is not 
                                                                                    
Erkenbayev, a member of parliament and leading 
businessman in Kara-Suu, of financing the party. 
According to the same article, for some time in 2002, 
Erkenbayev reportedly owned a company in Jalal-Abad 
called ‘Bin-Laden’. In an interview with ICG, he denied 
any links to Hizb ut-Tahrir, and suggested that the article 
originated in Uzbek security service circles that were trying 
to undermine his cross-border business dealings. He 
claimed to be in favour of an Islamic state, although his 
concept of such a state seems to be limited to the addition 
of some elements of the Sharia to the constitution. ICG 
interview, Osh, 13 February 2003.  
110 ICG interview, Jalal-Abad, December 2002. 
111 ICG interview, senior police officer, Dushanbe, 
February 2003. 
112 Dr Zaki Badawi, a well known Muslim cleric in the UK, 
says he thinks Gulf money is behind Hizb ut-Tahrir: ‘Not 
the Saudis, they dislike them, almost all the governments 
dislike them, because they are revolutionaries, saying all 
the regimes are illegitimate. But just as all roads lead to 
Rome, all finances lead to the Gulf. There are people in the 
Gulf who will encourage any radical movement, because 
they hate the regimes and they want to get at them, but they 
cannot do that openly, so they sponsor any movement that 
is anti-establishment’. Cited in Adam Lebor, A Heart 
Turned East: Among the Muslims of Europe and America 
(London, 1997), p. 145. 
particularly difficult to arrange transfers of money 
into the region, even by legal means. During a court 
case in Sughd in 2003, police alleged that a party 
leader received regular bank payments of several 
thousand dollars from the U.S. 
These transfers, however, may have become more 
difficult to arrange in the last year, or financing to 
the central party may have slowed. Several sources 
agreed that financing seemed to have diminished as 
evidenced by fewer leaflets printed and their lower 
quality. According to police sources, members 
admit financing has become more difficult.  
E. ACTIVITIES 
1. Propaganda 
In Central Asia, Hizb ut-Tahrir works primarily 
through the dissemination of literature. Most 
commonly this involves unsuspecting residents 
finding a one-page leaflet left in their mailbox 
during the night. Most leaflets appear to be printed 
in Central Asia. Indeed, the poor quality of paper 
and type suggest production probably on home 
computers and copiers of low quality. Leaflets may 
be given out at the bazaar in some places – 
Kyrgyzstan, for example – although the overnight 
flyer is more common after there have been wide-
scale arrests.  
A large number of Hizb ut-Tahrir books have also 
spread throughout the region. These are believed to 
be imported. Most recently, the organisation has 
produced videocassettes, tape recordings, and CDs 
of leaders’ speeches and sermons. There is 
speculation that many of these materials were 
produced in the Middle East or Europe. Some are 
in Arabic but others are in Central Asian languages. 
Over 300 audiocassettes have been confiscated in 
Kyrgyzstan.113  
The internet is Hizb ut-Tahrir’s main tool for 
disseminating its message around the world, in 
multiple languages. It is explicit in its desire to use 
modern technology to promote Islam. During the 
1990s, Uzbek security services increased surveillance 
of electronic mail and blocked access to the party’s 
websites. Nevertheless, many computer users manage 
 
 
113 ICG interview with Bolot Djanuzakov, Deputy Head of 
the Department on Defence and Security of the Presidential 
Administration, Bishkek, 15 January, 2003. 
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to access sites through other channels, and e-mail is 
difficult to block, although it is probably monitored to 
a certain extent. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir tactics appear to be changing 
somewhat. There seems to have been internal 
objection to the reliance on leaflet distribution, 
which exposed members to serious risk. The 
number of leaflets and the level of distribution 
appears to have gone down significantly during 
2002. One activist in southern Kyrgyzstan even 
said: ‘Now we do not distribute leaflets. There are 
other ways. We have found more powerful ways 
than leaflets. The most powerful way is to walk 
around and talk to people…’114 In fact, leaflets are 
still distributed, on average one new one every 
couple of months, but otherwise there is little sign 
of public activity. It seems likely that the party will 
continue to work through informal conversations, 
which puts them at much less risk of arrest and 
allows them to put their case more fully to people.  
2. Demonstrations 
Another method that Hizb ut-Tahrir has pioneered 
has been demonstrations in defence of imprisoned 
members. All these have been by women, on the 
basis that police are much less likely to arrest or 
maltreat them than their menfolk.  
The largest incidents have been in Uzbekistan. On 
2 July 2001, about 400 mothers, sisters, and wives 
(some accompanied by young children) of Hizb ut-
Tahrir prisoners protested in Tashkent and Andijan, 
demanding the government end abuse of the men. 
Approximately 40 to 50 women were arrested and 
beaten in Tashkent, about 30 in Andijan. Reports 
conflict whether all have been released.115 Similar 
demonstrations have continued in 2002 and 2003. 
On 7 March 2003 women attempted to lead 
apparently coordinated protest marches in several 
cities.  
Small groups of women have also protested in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where the governments 
have dealt with them more leniently. In March 
2001, 150 women – many Hizb ut-Tahrir members, 
not just supporters – demonstrated in Karasu 
 
 
114 ICG interview, Hizb ut-Tahrir member, Karasu, January 
2003. 
115See Muslim Uzbekistan, 
www.caliphate.com /home/printable.php?DocumentID+1812 
and IWPR, 15 July 2001. 
district in Osh province where there is a 
particularly active group.116  
Both the trials and the release of members have 
also been used for publicity. Trials are particularly 
useful theatre. In some countries Hizb ut-Tahrir 
statements at trials have been reproduced as part of 
the party’s wider literature.117 According to a 
member from Kyrgyzstan (Karasu), more people 
showed up at his trial and then release than visited 
him on the birth of his children.118 Members 
claimed that several hundred persons attended the 
funeral of a member from Osh who died in prison. 
But whether this is really a sign of wider social 
support, or merely the solidarity of kinship groups 
and local neighbourhoods, is hard to ascertain. 
3. Prison work 
Work in prisons is also important for Hizb ut-
Tahrir, both to support members who are 
incarcerated and to proselytise among other 
prisoners. In Kyrgyzstan this is done more or less 
openly:  
We help those who are in prison, both our 
own [members] and other prisoners. We give 
money for cigarettes once a month; once or 
twice a year we give presents. For example, 
last Kurban-Ait we gave plov (traditional 
dish of rice and lamb) to all the cells; we 
made 35 kilograms. And this Kurban-Ait we 
passed cakes – every cell got one cake. And 
to our own [members] we send packages 
once or twice a month.119 
In Uzbekistan such things are more difficult but the 
women’s support network is probably used for 
deliveries. Many members claimed they have had 
considerable success inside prison converting 




116 ICG interview, police officer, Karasu district, Osh 
Province, Kyrgyzstan, April 2003. 
117 There are several on the Hizb ut-Tahrir website. See for 
example the defence speech by a member in Turkey, before 
an Ankara court on 28 February 2001. Available at 
www.hizb ut-tahrir.org 
118 ICG interview with Hizb ut-Tahrir member, Karasu, 
Kyrgyzstan, January 2003. 
119 ICG interview, Osh, February 2003. 
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This aspect also seems to be somewhat divergent 
from the general party line, which has tended to 
argue that there should only be ‘spiritual’ rewards 
for those who suffer in the name of the cause. The 
sense of solidarity represented by assistance to 
prisoners is an important part of the way the 
movement attracts and retains members in Central 
Asia but it seems to be somewhat specific to the 
region.  
4. Violence? 
In general, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s range of activities in 
Central Asia is rather limited. Being forced to work 
underground means that there is little it can do to 
engage the mass of the population. Leaflets only 
reach small numbers. In some ways, this gives the 
organisation an advantage: if there were an open 
political system, the probable failure to attract 
crowds like those seen in Jakarta to marches or 
demonstrations would show that there was very 
limited public support for the party’s ideas. While it 
remains underground, it can more easily persuade 
itself that the Caliphate may be just around the 
corner. 
But there is obviously a danger of frustration 
building in the organisation if it makes no impact 
on the political system. Leaders point out that 
despite the intense repression that members have 
faced, there has been no resort to violence.120  
Indeed, there has never been a proven case of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir involvement in any violent or terrorist act 
in Central Asia, and none of the accusations of 
arms caches or violent activity stand up to 
scrutiny.121 Some government officials professed to 
believe that the very paucity of hard evidence is a 
sign of preparation for some potential armed 
activities. One highly-placed official said, “There 
have been no terrorist acts yet, but Hizb stores 
weapons, there are facts…”122.  
 
 
120 Dr Imran Waheed, Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK) spokesperson, 5 
June 2003. 
121 The government of Uzbekistan has claimed that Hizb ut-
Tahrir was involved in a series of bombings in Tashkent in 
February 1999, which killed sixteen people. The evidence 
produced by the government was deeply flawed, and its 
version of the incident remains contested. Security forces 
frequently claim to find weapons or ammunition in the 
possession of members but few observers take these claims 
seriously. 
122 ICG interview, Bishkek, January 2003. In 2002 Kyrgyz 
police claimed to discover an arms cache in the possession 
Hardly anyone in the security services really 
believes that Hizb ut-Tahrir is an armed movement, 
although government officials are always quick to 
point to it or to the IMU whenever a criminal act is 
committed. Most Kyrgyz security officials ICG 
interviewed agreed no direct security threat 
emanates from the party. Even Uzbek officials 
pointed to a potential turn to violence rather than 
any current direct threat. 
Nevertheless, given the vagueness of Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s ideological commitment to non-violence, it 
would be surprising if there was not dissent among 
some members. Most follow the party line in 
interviews, insisting that they are opposed to 
violence, and there is little reason to doubt their 
sincerity. But occasionally there is a sense that 
some are frustrated by the policy of non-violence. 
N., a member from Osh, talked about the hated 
police: ‘Everybody says we are extremists. But if 
we were extremists, we would bury them [the 
police] alive”.123 As he spoke, he was credible.  
Dissatisfaction with non-violence was certainly 
present among some members who fled to 
Afghanistan. Among the sizeable documentation, 
including video and audio tapes found in the 
remains of the IMU camp, was a short memoir 
written by a former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir from 
Uzbekistan who had fled in 1999 and ended up 
with the IMU. It strongly denounced Hizb ut-Tahrir 
non-violence, claiming the party was “throwing in 
the fire many worthy young Muslims”, each of 
which could have been a “loyal and worthy fighter 
for Islam”.124  
                                                                                    
of a Hizb ut-Tahrir member in Arslanbob, including three 
grenades, 48 pistols, and 240 bullets. Hizb ut-Tahrir denied 
that it had anything to do with the arms, and the case was 
not proven. Apart from this, the only other arms found 
during arrests of members in Kyrgyzstan in 2002-03 were 
44 bullets ‘discovered’ during an arrest in Kara-Su. 
According to human rights activists, police themselves 
admitted to the arrested man that they had put them there. 
When the mother of the arrested man attempted to throw 
the bullets in the toilet, police officers protested, admitting 
that they had to return them to the police armory from 
which they had originally taken them. ICG interviews, Osh, 
April 2003. 
123 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
124 His story is entitled Nur topdim – bermaiman (I found 
the light – I will not let it go), and was published by the 
IMU in August 2001. The manuscripts and documents 
were found by a U.S. journalist, and many of them, 
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5. Shahadat (Martyrdom) 
Following the funeral of a Hizb ut-Tahrir member 
in Osh who died in prison from tuberculosis, his 
death was celebrated as that of a martyr. Some 400 
people apparently attended. One said later: “I have 
no doubt that any one of us would give up his life. 
If the choice was my faith or life, I would choose 
my faith. Another said, ‘It is better to die, than to 
live like this’.125 
The theme of martyrdom seems to have become 
fashionable in Hizb ut-Tahrir circles. At its most 
extreme, it was expressed by a member in Osh: 
It’s better to go to Palestine, take a grenade, 
and blow it up. That’s how to act against 
Jews. [ICG: Do you want to go to 
Palestine?]. Yes, I want to become a 
martyr.126 
Not all members have this view. Another said, ‘its 
not right, blowing yourself up, like in Palestine, we 
have a different aim’.127 This confusion over 
martyrdom is symptomatic of the wider party 
ideology, which although theoretically opposed to 
such actions, is rhetorically sympathetic. 
Others saw potential for martyrdom in their own 
countries, but in a different way:  
Life Allah himself takes away. There are 
many martyrs now. My dream is to become a 
martyr – they kill our boys in prison. To die 
in the hands of the enemy is the greatest 
dream.128 
Much of this is pure bravado. Most members are 
extremely circumspect and do not admit their 
membership to people they do not trust. 
Nevertheless, there are reports of members almost 
courting arrest by openly distributing leaflets or 
talking incautiously to fellow-workers about their 
beliefs. A scholar witnessed the arrest of a member 
in Tashkent:  
                                                                                    
including this document, were studied by Uzbek scholar B. 
Babadjanov. 
125 ICG interviews, Osh, February 2003. Several members 
also said they wanted to go and fight in Iraq against U.S. 
forces but a lot of this seems to have been brave statements 
to impress interviewers rather than any serious intent. 
126 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
127 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
128 ICG interview, Karasu, Osh province, April 2003 
In September 2001 I witnessed the arrest of a 
young man aged 22 at Chorsu market for 
distributing Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets. The 
police started to beat him up in front of the 
crowd. The police warned anybody who tried 
to intervene that they would get in trouble 
too. The boy, however, remained surprisingly 
calm and constantly shouted ‘Allah Akbar’. 
He also managed to shout out an obviously 
recited phrase: ‘Wake up Brothers! Depose 
this unbelieving Jew Karimov and elect a 
Caliph from amongst yourselves’.129 
This kind of behaviour is interpreted by members 
as a form of martyrdom, but it is not clear if it is a 
specific policy or a personal choice. There have 
been no cases, however, of suicide bombings or 
other forms of violent martyrdom among Hizb ut-
Tahrir members, and there is little likelihood of the 
party moving in that direction given its ideological 
background and historical record. 
F. WHAT HIZB UT-TAHIR WANTS 
Hizb ut-Tahrir’s agenda in Central Asia largely 
reflects the broader goals and methodology of the 
party’s international network. Its literature in the 
region makes the same two central demands: 
creation of an Islamic society and establishment of 
an Islamic state, the Caliphate. The Central Asian 
branches closely model their materials on the 
central party’s agenda, reproducing faithfully its 
proclamations, along with those from other 
countries of interest. But they also issue their own 
leaflets that reflect the party’s specific agenda in 
Central Asia.  
The global leaflets are in the Kyrgyz, Uzbek and 
Tajik languages and distributed as widely as 
possible. Typical is a leaflet, apparently from the 
Kuwait section of the party, against the U.S. 
military deployment in the Gulf, issued in January 
2003.130 More have followed about Iraq, which 
seems to have struck a chord in Central Asia. Other 
typical themes include a call to defend Palestine 
from its Israeli occupiers and strong criticism of the 
 
 
129 ICG interview, B. Babadjanov, May 2003. 
130 Hizb ut-Tahrir, ‘Amerikaning oshkora tazhovuzi 
karshisida musulmon hokimilarining bir-birlarini 
khorlarcha yordamsiz tashlab kuiishlari’ [The despicable 
submission of the rulers before the open American 
aggression], Kuwait, 29 January 2003. 
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U.S. occupation of Iraq. All these leaflets are also 
published on Hizb ut-Tahrir’s websites, from where 
local groups seem to take them and translate 
them.131 
Some of the more abstract global issues sometimes 
seem far from the everyday concerns of many 
Muslims in Central Asia. The Palestinian issue, for 
example, has much less resonance than in Arab 
countries. This attitude may have changed 
somewhat during the war in Iraq, when widespread 
opposition had little opportunity for expression. In 
Uzbekistan, in particular, the government’s support 
for the war did not permit any criticism to be 
voiced, despite the objections of an apparently 
overwhelming majority to U.S. military action. 
Under such conditions of censorship, any group 
that put out material critical of the war was bound 
to find a ready audience.  
The second category of leaflet links global and 
ideological concerns to local issues. It is not clear 
how themes are chosen for such leaflets but they 
probably arise naturally in discussions among the 
leadership in reaction to local events. Only some of 
these leaflets appear subsequently on Hizb ut-
Tahrir websites, and it is not clear whether there is 
a process of clearance with the central leadership.132 
The leaflets discuss poverty, unemployment, and 
difficult social conditions of Central Asians. This 
attempt to manipulate popular dissatisfaction with 
government policies is part of the party’s general 
philosophy. Taqiuddin an-Nabhani wrote that: 
The success of a collective movement is 
measured by its ability to instigate 
resentment among the masses and to extort 
them to express their resentment each time 
the regime undermines or manipulates their 




131 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
132 It is not clear if these leaflets are cleared with the central 
leadership. In the UK a representative says that local parties 
are free to compose their own leaflets as long as they do not 
go against the central tenets of the party’s ideology. ICG 
interview, Dr Imran Waheed, 5 June 2003, London. 
133 Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, Structuring of a Party, Al-
Khilafah Publications (London, 2001), translation from 
Arabic of Attakattul el-Hizbi, ,pp. 24-25. 
In Uzbekistan a leaflet in October 2002 focused on 
the results of President Karimov’s restrictive policy 
against bazaar traders, which has had a profound 
impact on most of the population.134 In Tajikistan a 
recent leaflet dealt with a range of socio-economic 
problems including those of migrants to Russia, 
land mines on Tajikistan’s border with Uzbekistan, 
gas and electricity supplies, and corruption of 
government officials:  
All government officials, starting with the 
president, compete with each other in building 
grandiose multi-storey houses and dachas, and 
travel in the most fashionable cars.135 
This type of complaint, common among ordinary 
people but rarely visible in the highly censored 
media, probably has more impact than any global 
or ideological calls. As a religious leader in 
Tajikistan generally opposed to Hizb ut-Tahrir 
admitted: ‘You might not like them, but you can’t 
deny they are the only people telling the truth about 
Tajikistan’.136 
President Karimov of Uzbekistan is a frequent 
target. The messages brand his rule as ‘tyranny of 
the Jew’ and consistently demand his removal. A 
recent leaflet harped on Karimov and his 
persecution of Muslims, stating that ‘Jews control 
the MVD and SNB (security agencies), and pursue 
Hizb ut-Tahrir members, their homes, relatives, 
neighbours, and family members’. A frequent 
theme is that when Karimov is overthrown, 
Muslims will be free to live under the justice of the 
Caliphate. One leaflet states: 
We ask the Almighty, that he carry away all 
our troubles, defend us, destroy the Jew 
Karimov, and his comrades in arms, and call us 
all from the darkness of the tunnel to the light, 
 
 
134 Hizb ut-Tahrir, ‘Karimov karorlari Uzbekistondagi 
musulmon khalkin yanchib tashlash uchun chikarilgan 
kurollar jumlasidandir’ [The laws of Karimov are weapons 
for repressing the Muslims of Uzbekistan], 4 October 2002. 
See ICG Asia Report No. 46, Uzbekistan’s Economic 
Reforms: Illusion or Reality? 18 February 2003. 
135 Hizb ut-Tahrir (Tajikistan), ‘Muborizai hukumati 
Tojikiston bar ziddi ahli da’vat’ [‘The struggle of the 
Government of Tajikistan against the chosen people’], 3 
March 2003. 
136 ICG interview, Dushanbe, April 2003. 
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and unite us all under the flag of the holy 
Islamic Caliphate. We hope only in this.137 
There are rarely any purely religious themes in 
leaflets: all religious issues are related to 
overarching political questions. One common 
theme is the incorrectness of certain Central Asian 
religious traditions from Hizb ut-Tahrir’s view of 
Islam. Navruz, the ancient Zoroastrian holiday that 
is celebrated at the beginning of spring in 
Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia, is widely but 
falsely believed by many Central Asians to be a 
Muslim holiday. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s leaflet says: 
‘Navruz is the holiday of the unbelievers and 
pagans…Muslims! How long will your rulers, 
servants of unbelievers, force you to celebrate the 
holidays of the unbelievers?’138 Of course, little of 
this has any impact on wider society, which 
continues to celebrate any holiday it can.139 
Other local propaganda in Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan has focused on repression by security 
forces. One leaflet in February 2003 was devoted to 
the death of a Hizb ut-Tahrir member, Ubaidullo 
Tukhtasin, in prison on 31 January 2003, who was 
declared a shahid (martyr).140 In Uzbekistan Hizb ut-
Tahrir often publicises the arrests of members or asks 
human rights groups to intervene on behalf of 
members. A typical call “to human rights 
organisations” requested investigation of the 
suspicious disappearance of two members after their 
arrest on 6 August 2002. Human rights groups often 
assist in such cases, although the text of the Hizb ut-
Tahrir appeal expresses some scepticism: ‘Why do 
[human rights groups] exist? To defend all people 
independent of their religion, race and nationality, or 
to defend the rights of everybody except Muslims?’141 
 
 
137 Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Muborak iidi Ramazon tabrigi” 
[Congratulations with blessed Ramadan], 5 December 
2002. 
138 Hizb ut-Tahriz, ‘Navruz kimning bairami?’ [Whose 
holiday is Navruz?], Kyrgyzstan, 20 March 2003. 
139 In similar vein, a leaflet issued in March 2003 in 
Kyrgyzstan inveighed against International Women’s Day, 
widely celebrated in the former Soviet Union on 8 March. 
According to one member: ‘Klara Tsetkin invented the 8 
March holiday, but she herself was a prostitute’. ICG 
interview, Osh, April 2003. 
140 Hizb ut-Tahrir, ‘Dikkat shakhid!’ [Attention, Martyr!], 5 
February 2003, Kyrgyzstan. 
141 Hizb ut-Tahrir (Uzbekistan), “Obshchestvenym 
organizatsiyam po pravam cheloveka” [To Human Rights 
Organisations], 7 February 2003, reprinted in Human 
Rights Society of Uzbekistan, “Ezgulik”, Informatsionnyi 
The defence of prisoners in Uzbekistan has also 
become an international issue for the party, which 
mounted a campaign in London in 2003 highlighting 
human rights abuses there.142 
There is, of course, a much wider range of 
theoretical literature, ‘adopted’ by Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
much of it published in local languages, but little of 
this is apparently read by local members, at least at 
the lowest level.143 Although the party claims to 
work in the sphere of ideas, it would be wrong to 
consider it an intellectual movement. Most 
members are reasonably well educated, but 
essentially simple folk, with only limited 
inclination to read major theoretical works on 
Islamic concepts. Much of the education many 
received came orally from their teachers, and their 
discussions are fairly simplistic, within the bounds 
of what they have been taught. This limits the 
possibility for intellectual ‘dialogue’ with Hizb ut-
Tahrir. Indeed, most members show no interest in 
real discussion of their ideas and appear for the 
most part incapable of moving beyond their very 
narrow worldview. 
                                                                                    
biulleten [Information Bulletin], March (No. 8), 2003, 
Namangan. 
142 See www.1924.org. 
143 This has been noted by ICG researchers and others. The 
Uzbek scholar B. Babadjanov says: ‘Some of my 
interviews with Hizb ut-Tahrir members left me at a dead 
end: I carefully prepared for such meetings, conscientiously 
reading their literature and leaflets and on that basis formed 
a series of questions for my interviewees. However, I could 
never receive a coherent answer, and if I could get an 
answer, interviewees relied, not on a particular piece of 
party literature, but on the opinion, for example, of 
mushrifs. They were pleasantly surprised by my 
knowledge’. ICG interview, Tashkent, May 2003. 
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IV. THE IMPACT 
The impact of this relatively small political group 
on wider society is difficult to assess. Hizb ut-Tahir 
claims wide success in spreading its ideas and 
influence through society. Many others assert that 
the party’s influence is minimal and shrinking.  
Most extensive is probably the sympathy Hizb ut-
Tahrir members gain as victims of unpopular 
repressive regimes. As dissatisfaction with the 
Uzbek government has mounted, sympathy for 
Hizb ut-Tahrir has increased.144 Attempts by the 
authorities to isolate families of party members 
apparently had some initial success but the impact 
of this social ostracism seems to have faded. 
Relatives of members in Uzbekistan recall the 
fatwa of the Muftiate that called on neighbours to 
shun them. ‘There was a time when that had some 
effect’, recalls one father. ‘But now they come and 
help me when I have problems’.145 
This kind of support is largely a show of solidarity 
against a widely disliked regime and particularly 
against brutal, unpopular police. There is much less 
evidence that it reflects real political support, 
though party members sometimes claim otherwise.  
Views about the depth of support are also mixed in 
Kyrgyzstan. Members naturally claim growing public 
backing. One said: ‘Everybody takes leaflets freely 
now. It’s rare for someone to give a leaflet in to the 
police – sometimes they sell them for vodka’.146 
Another claimed: ‘Before when people heard about 
the Caliphate, they were afraid. But now they say “I 
wish the Caliphate would come sooner’.147 Police 
generally deny there is widespread public support for 
the movement, although they often encounter 
resistance from neighbours and relatives when they 
attempt an arrest, particularly in tight-knit Uzbek 
communities. They face significant problems finding 
witnesses prepared to testify in court against Hizb ut-
Tahrir members.148 Again, however, this may be more 
the result of solidarity against a perceived common 




144 ICG interviews with Ezgulik leader Ahmad Adbullaev 
in Namangan, Uzbekistan, 9 January 2003. 
145 ICG interview, Ferghan province, April 2003. 
146 ICG interview, Aravan, February 2003. 
147 ICG interview, Osh, 2003. 
148 ICG interviews, police officers, Karasu, April 2003. 
Some public support comes from the authority that a 
few Hizb ut-Tahrir leaders gain in the community, 
particularly if they combine piety with moral 
influence and business enterprise. A policeman said:  
When Mulodjanov was arrested, they said to 
us: he came here to live, gave a lot of people 
here work, opened an ice-cream factory and a 
teashop – now there are no drunkards here, 
young people don’t smoke hashish, he gave 
twenty people work.149 
‘I don’t know anything about Hizb ut-Tahrir’, said 
a relative of an Osh member, ‘but I know people 
who were drug addicts, and have become good 
people’.150 
This impression of the party as a movement that 
improves society by helping with personal 
problems seems limited to a small part of the 
population who have experienced this impact 
directly. It is also not encouraged by Hizb ut-
Tahrir, which scorns charitable or social work as a 
distraction from the political struggle. For most 
people, especially ethnic Kyrgyz in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, Hizb ut-Tahrir is akin to a strange 
religious sect, far from the realities of everyday life 
and with no real influence on their thinking.  
Instances of passive support do not demonstrate 
significant backing for the party’s political goals. 
There is very little evidence of popular 
commitment to an Islamic state in the sense that 
Hizb ut-Tahrir advocates in any Central Asian 
country. There may be limited support for some 
elements of Sharia in more conservative areas but 
this is generally limited to strictures against what is 
seen as a decline in morality, calls for legalisation 
of polygamy, or coordination of traditional rituals 
and state requirements in issues such as marriage. 
In many countries, Hizb ut-Tahrir has focused on 
opinion makers in an attempt to impact on policy. 
In Central Asia, at least, this has met with little 
success. Although members like to claim they have 
access to highly placed officials from time to time, 
the reality is rather less inspiring. One said: 
 
 
149 ICG interview, senior police officer, Jalal-Abad, March 
2003. Mulodjanov is the alleged Hizb ut-Tahrir leader in 
Arslanbob, in southern Kyrgyzstan.  
150 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
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I have talked [about Hizb ut-Tahrir] to the 
chairman of our village council, the chairman 
of the mahalla [local neighbourhood] 
committee, the director of our school. I knew 
one important person, and now I go to see 
him once a month. If he has people with him, 
he says to them: do you want to meet a Hizb? 
Have you ever seen a Hizb? And then I talk. 
He has a good opinion of Hizb ut-Tahrir. He 
just says, we are rushing things…151 
Members are particularly fond of claiming 
sympathisers among the security structures. One 
said: ‘The head of the prison said to us, “You really 
say the right things, but why don’t you say this to 
Akayev? Does Akayev know about this?”’152 
Another claimed some police refuse to arrest 
members.153 Some policemen do seem more 
sympathetic, or at least wary of taking excessive 
measures for fear of adverse reaction from the 
community. One Uzbek policeman told ICG:  
They say to us: ‘If you continue to persecute 
us, when you die nobody will come to your 
funeral.’ That would be shameful for us...If 
you struggle against them too hard, the imam 
won’t come to your house.154 
But most interviewees in the security forces treat 
Hizb ut-Tahrir with a large degree of contempt, and 
see it as a fringe group posing little or no threat. 
Members themselves do not attempt to infiltrate 
state structures. They say they are not allowed to 
work in the police, the security structures, or in 
local government – ‘anywhere where the 
Constitution functions strongly’, as one put it.155 
Without real support among the authorities, and 
having little impact on wider thinking in society, 
Hizb ut-Tahrir on its own seems destined to have 
only limited impact on Central Asia. The key 
questions may relate to its potential to spawn other, 
more violent groups or to act in alliance with armed 
Islamist organisations.  
 
 
151 ICG interview with Hizb ut-Tahrir member, Osh, 
February 2003. 
152 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
153 ICG interview, Aravan, February 2003. 
154 ICG interview, Jalal-Abad, December 2002. 
155 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
V. THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT 
A. DIVISIONS INSIDE HIZB UT-TAHRIR 
Despite its fairly authoritarian structures, disputes 
and divisions clearly have emerged from time to 
time within the party in Central Asia. These have 
primarily revolved around tactics. 
Not all divisions have necessarily been about the 
desirability of more radical actions. Babiyar 
Babadjanov researched one splinter group, the so-
called Akramiyyah, founded by Akram Yuldashev in 
1996 in Andijan. Although he retained much Hizb ut-
Tahrir thinking, including the commitment to 
‘intellectual’ rather than ‘violent’ struggle, Yuldashev 
attempted to adapt the tactics to the specific 
conditions of Central Asia, notably the Ferghana 
Valley. He pursued the idea of small Islamic 
community development, with members joining 
together to establish small industrial or agricultural 
enterprises. Common funds were formed that were 
distributed to members or sympathisers in need. This 
kind of socio-economic program seems to have been 
particularly effective in the difficult economic 
conditions of the Ferghana Valley and also to have 
mirrored people’s desire for reconstituted 
communities in an era of rapid social change.156 
Some have suggested that a more radical group 
could emerge from Hizb ut-Tahrir. In 1999 in 
Uzbekistan a fairly significant group from the 
Tashkent branch set up its own party, Hizb-an-
Nusra (Party of Victory). The details are not 
entirely clear, but it seems to have been dissatisfied 
with the propaganda method of political struggle, 
which had led to the arrest of a significant 
proportion of the younger membership, but it may 
also have been ready for more violent methods.157 
Some do seem to find the distribution of leaflets too 
dangerous, or pointless. One said: 
 
 
156 Similar economic ‘solidarity groups’ have been 
observed by ICG in southern Kyrgyzstan among Wahhabi 
communities. They essentially consist of simple credit 
unions, with provision for members to work together in 
collective enterprises. 
157 See Bakhtiyar Babadzhanov, ‘O deyatelnosti Hizb ut-
Tahrir al-islami v Uzbekistane’ [On the activities of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir al-islami in Uzbekistan], in Malashenko and 
Olcott (Eds.), Islam, pp. 164-165. 
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 I even tried to object to the leadership…: 
why do they separate themselves from 
people, why do they call themselves ‘Hizb’… 
why do they give out leaflets? But then they 
explained to me, that in the Koran there is a 
verse: ‘From the Muslims will emerge one 
ummah, which will call itself as it likes, and 
will say, what is good, and what is bad’.158  
The potential for splits and breakaway groups 
should not be exaggerated. One of the interesting 
features of Hizb ut-Tahrir is how few seem to 
leave once they have joined. Most police officers 
interviewed for this report could only recall the 
occasional instance. One member did admit that 
sometimes people did leave or were expelled: 
‘Only the weak leave Hizb ut-Tahrir. If somebody 
breaks their oath – they expel him, and do not give 
him any tasks. They don’t trust him’.159 A member 
of five years’ standing could only think of three 
cases:  
One had a drunken father, who hated us… 
whenever we prayed he would always throw us 
out, he put pressure on his son, went to the 
police. And the son could not withstand the 
pressure of his father, and left Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
The second who left was persuaded to leave by 
the police. The third – he went mad in the police 
detention centre and became an informer. 
…When he came out of prison, he still hung 
around us, but started smoking drugs.160 
This level of commitment seems to be only partly the 
result of ideology. Some suggest that there are 
punishments for those who leave, but there is no real 
evidence of what these might entail. More likely, 
group psychology plays a major role. The close ties 
that build up among members provide an important 
alternative community for many members, who often 
feel that they have lost close ties in society in some 
way. Frequently members seem to become cut off 
from their former friends, and sometimes relatives.161 
Returning to the wider society is probably very 
difficult. Hizb ut-Tahrir groups themselves often 
 
 
158 ICG interview, Osh, March 2003. 
159 ICG interview, Aravan, March 2003. 
160 ICG interview, Aravan, January 2003. 
161 There are frequent reports of Hizb ut-Tahrir members 
being in conflict with their parents over membership. 
Others say their parents are happy that at least they are not 
involved in drugs or crime. 
seem to encourage this break with society, at least in 
the initial stages of membership.  
Regardless of the reasons, this attachment to the 
organisation means that the prospect of a 
significant split from below is fairly unlikely. Small 
groups may break away, but it seems probable that 
only a serious change in tactics from above would 
affect the group’s attitudes. Hizb ut-Tahrir is 
unlikely to fade away, although it may also grow 
little. It could become fairly stagnant, with 
declining influence, which might encourage some 
members to reconsider its tactics and adopt a more 
radical stance.  
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
IMU, THE IRP AND HIZB UT-TAHRIR  
One option for Hizb ut-Tahrir to expand its 
influence is to join with other groups that have 
similar aims but different tactics. As noted above, 
there is ambivalence in its ideology about working 
with others, but the potential is clearly there and 
justified by the vague concept of appealing for 
outside assistance, or nusrat. However, the party 
has always rejected other Islamist movements as 
not following the correct tactics. The founder, 
Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, wrote, ‘Not a single correct 
structure, that aimed at the revival of the ummah, 
was established in any of the Islamic countries 
during the past century’.162 But this has not stopped 
cooperation in certain circumstances, and given the 
frequent assertions by governments in the region 
that Hizb ut-Tahrir is merely one face of a united 
armed Islamist movement, it is important to explore 
whether these links exist and what potential there is 
for them to develop.  
The only other significant Islamist movements in 
Central Asia have been the Islamic Renaissance Party 
(IRP) in Tajikistan and the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU).163 The IRP moved from being an 
armed opposition during the Tajik civil war to a legal 
party taking part peacefully in the constitutional 
process. The IMU, however, increasingly became part 
of the international militant Islamist movement linked 
to the Taliban in Afghanistan and operated from 
 
 
162 An-Nabhani, Structuring of a Party, op. cit., p. 19.  
163 A wide range of smaller groups appeared in Uzbekistan 
in the early 1990s. Most have disappeared, either because 
of government repression, or because members left to join 
the IMU. 
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military bases, initially in Tajikistan and later in 
Afghanistan. 
The IMU has received the most international attention 
in recent years, especially since its dramatic, if 
unsuccessful, military incursions into southern 
Kyrgyzstan in August 1999 and August 2000 shocked 
the region and exposed the weakness of Central Asian 
militaries. It was a guerrilla-like movement of perhaps 
3,000 fighters that sought political and religious ends 
through force. Its bases and much of its organisation 
were destroyed during the U.S.-led military 
intervention in Afghanistan in 2001.164  
The relationship between Hizb ut-Tahrir and the 
two groups is very different. The party is largely 
hostile to the IRP, accusing it of ‘selling out’, by 
accepting the peace agreement and taking up posts 
in the government. Its attitude was summed up in a 
recent leaflet:  
Although Islam never makes peace with kufr 
[unbelievers], the leader of the IRP, A. Nuri, 
not possessing adequate level of religious and 
political knowledge, in exchange for several 
[government] positions, made peace with the 
government of Tajikistan. As a result the 
government paralysed this movement. The 
party became a toy, acting only in the 
interests of the government.165 
This tension between the IRP and the Hizb ut-
Tahrir is mutual, especially at leadership level. 
Some ordinary members are more sympathetic, 
partly because of their own criticism of the IRP’s 
stance. But there seems almost no chance of any 
alliance between the two groups: the IRP is intent 
largely on survival in the increasingly intolerant 
Tajik political system and avoids any possible 
connotation of links to more radical movements. 
The relationship with the IMU is more interesting. 
There have been several unconfirmed reports of 
meetings between Hizb ut-Tahrir leaders and those 
of the IMU and the Taliban. The supposed 
substance of these meetings is uncertain. The leader 
 
 
164 For more detail, see ICG briefing, The IMU and the 
Hizb ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign, 
30 January 2002. 
165 Hizb ut-Tahrir (Tajikistan), ‘Muborizai hukumati 
Tojikiston bar ziddi ahli da’vat’ [‘The struggle of the 
Government of Tajikistan against the chosen people’], 3 
March 2003. 
of Hizb ut-Tahrir (Indonesia), Ismail Yusanto, 
claims that the party discussed with Taliban leader 
Mullah Omar the idea of his leading the movement 
for a caliphate, but that he was not interested in 
anything but Afghanistan. 166 
Whether this might have led to some cooperation if 
there had been no intervention in Afghanistan is 
difficult to ascertain. A representative in London 
noted that there would be little point asking the 
IMU for assistance, since it did not have significant 
military capabilities.167 After the fiasco of the 
IMU’s armed interventions in Kyrgyzstan, it seems 
likely that Hizb ut-Tahrir concluded there was little 
to gain and much to lose from an alliance with such 
an incompetent fighting force.  
There are also considerable theological differences 
between Hizb ut-Tahrir and the wider neo-Wahhabi 
philosophy shared by the Taliban, al-Qaeda and 
similar groups. Little love is lost between Wahhabis 
in Central Asia and their HT ‘brothers’. They reject 
each other as profoundly wrong on fundamental 
theological questions, notably the acceptance of 
certain hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet 
Mohammed). The main anti-Hizb ut-Tahrir website is 
Wahhabi-run, praises the Taliban, and rejects Hizb ut-
Tahrir as ‘secular modernists’.168 
Nevertheless, the ideological basis of the IMU, 
ostensibly part of the wider Taliban-led forces in 
Afghanistan, was not always so clear-cut, and its 
documents demonstrate considerable sympathy with 
and admiration towards the Hizb ut-Tahrir, although 
there is evidence of frustration with its refusal to take 
up arms against the government. IMU documents 
contain no significant critiques of Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
though in notes on the party’s activities, IMU officials 
frequently object to its peaceful tactics, asserting that 
‘we have to talk to the government in the only 
language they understand’.169  
The attitudes towards the IMU of ordinary Hizb ut-
Tahrir members in Central Asia are interesting and 
 
 
166 ‘Tidak Harus Hizbut Tahrir yang Mendirikan Khilafah’, 
Suara Hidayatullah, Vol.15, No.6, October 2002. 
167 ICG interview, Dr Imran Waheeb, Hizb ut-Tahrir (UK) 
spokesperson, 5 June 2003, London. 
168 See the articles at www.htexposed.com. The site links to 
www.islamuncovered.com, a popular pro-al-Qaida website.  
169 These conclusions are based on IMU documents 
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slightly ambiguous, as an excerpt from an ICG 
interview with a HT member demonstrates: 
ICG:  What do you think of the IMU?  
HT:  They are our brothers  
ICG:  Do you support them?  
HT:  Yes, I support anyone who supports 
Allah.  
ICG: They want to overthrow the 
government.  
HT:  Ah, I don’t support that…170 
 
Another long-standing member was less equivocal: 
Everywhere people want to build Islam. The IMU – I 
also consider them brothers, the Taliban, Wahhabis, 
are also brothers… But they don’t have a program’.171 
 
Others were more openly against the IMU. ‘We 
have nothing in common with the IMU, we 
condemn them. …they also read the Koran, but 
they have different views. We need to prepare 
people towards the Caliphate’.172 But it is important 
to point out that most members have little 
knowledge of the wider Islamist movement. Asked 
what he thought of the Wahhabi movement, a 
member admitted he had only read about it in an 
encyclopaedia.173 
 
The differences in tactics seem too great to overcome 
at the lower level, without significant ideological 
manoeuvring on the part of the transnational 
leadership. Given the serious damage caused to IMU 
capabilities by the U.S.-led intervention in 
Afghanistan, it is unlikely that a serious alliance 
would be particularly useful to the Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
The party’s insistence that any military action should 
be carried out only when there is a chance of success, 
and its general opposition to terrorism, seems 
genuine. It does seem possible though that at least a 
part of Hizb ut-Tahrir, particularly in Uzbekistan, 
might respond to a call for more radical measures, but 
at present it probably has more to lose than to gain 
from such a move.  
 
Overall, there is no evidence of significant 
organisational or ideological links with the IMU, 
beyond some possibly desultory contacts during the 
Taliban era in Afghanistan. Whether there is any 
 
 
170 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
171 ICG interview, Karasu, Osh Province, April 2003. 
172 ICG interview, Jalal-Abad, April 2003. 
173 ICG interview, Karasu, Osh province, April 2003.  
potential for future alliances with other groups may 
depend on whether some emerge in the future from 
the ranks of the IMU and possibly from other 
disaffected groups within Central Asian society. 
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VI. STATE RESPONSES 
The evidence suggests that Hizb ut-Tahrir is far 
from presenting a present-day threat to the stability 
of the Central Asian states in any direct sense. 
There is no evidence that it has any military 
capabilities, only limited evidence that it would 
even contemplate a call to arms under present 
conditions, and no evidence that it has significant 
support in structures such as the army, which could 
be used in pursuit of its goals.  
Instead it is a relatively small, radical group, with 
little influence on wider society and almost none on 
opinion-makers in present political systems, whose 
ideas have gained little acceptance outside the 
ranks of marginalised young men. Why then are 
Central Asian governments so afraid of it? 
There is a good reason, and a bad one. The good 
reason to be afraid is that Hizb ut-Tahrir has 
developed a following of thousands of young men 
who are committed to overthrowing regional 
governments and establishing an Islamist order. 
They are highly ideological, psychologically 
manipulated, and vulnerable to more radical 
instructions from above.  
Although they have so far proved resistant to calls 
from other groups to join an armed struggle, such a 
development cannot be excluded. It is unlikely, for 
the reasons outlined above, but not impossible, and 
so it is understandable that governments wish to 
control the group and ensure that it does not expand 
significantly or gain wider social support. They 
should also be concerned to avoid the kind of 
radicalisation of its members discussed above. 
The bad reason to emphasise fear of the party is 
that its existence is useful for regimes trying to 
maintain authoritarian systems in an environment 
of international pressure for reform. Where systems 
are built around the existence of internal and 
external enemies, it is difficult to move forward 
without undermining the very basis of the system 
itself. All the countries of the region are prone to 
use the ‘Islamic threat’ as a justification for 
overgrown security forces, lack of democracy and 
restrictions on freedom of expression. Too often 
Hizb ut-Tahrir is a useful excuse to avoid 
challenging the status quo. Too often Western 
governments, caught up in a global ‘war on terror’ 
take such an excuse at face value. 
There is much more of a danger that the kind of 
policies governments have adopted will themselves 
contribute to the growth and radicalisation of the 
organisation, and in doing so unwittingly expand its 
influence from the margins to the centre.  
A. UZBEKISTAN 
The Uzbek regime first began targeting Hizb ut-
Tahrir in 1997, although it was a little known 
organisation compared with the militant Islamist 
groups that the government claimed were operating 
at the time in the Ferghana Valley. Mass arrests 
began in 1998 and were followed by major show 
trials, primarily in Tashkent and the Ferghana 
Valley. These were almost always characterised by 
confessions, most likely forced through torture.  
After the assassination attempt on President 
Karimov in February 1999, which the Uzbek 
government blamed on ‘Islamic terrorists’, 
including Hizb ut-Tahrir, arrests dramatically 
escalated again. The party itself claims that more 
than 8,000 of its members were arrested at one time 
or another during this period.174 The Uzbek security 
services claim that 4,200 were still in prison in 
2002.175 The Independent Organisation for Human 
Rights in Uzbekistan puts the total of political 
prisoners at that time at 7,600, of which 7,400 were 
‘religious’ prisoners, and 4,200 members of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir.176  
Particularly in the late 1990s, courts dealt out 
extremely long sentences – fifteen to twenty years 
in prison – for members, who often were convicted 
on the flimsiest of evidence. Since 2001, these 
terms have fallen somewhat. In recent cases, 
activists have received about nine to twelve 
years.177 Those convicted are charged with anti-
constitutional activities, inciting religious hatred, 
and attempted overthrow of the state.  
 
 
174 Hizb ut-Tahrir (Tajikistan), ‘Muborizai hukumati 
Tojikiston bar ziddi ahli da’vat,’ [‘The struggle of the 
Government of Tajikistan against the chosen people’], 3 
March 2003. 
175 Galina Bukharbaeva, ‘Uzbekistan: Islamic Group 
Driven Underground’, IWPR, 7 August 2002. 
176 ICG Interview with Mikhail Ardzinov, head of 
Independent Human Rights Organisation of Uzbekistan, 
January 2003. This does not take into account releases 
under the amnesty of December 2002. 
177 BBC, ‘Uzbeks Imprisoned for Religious Activities’, 5 
October 2001 
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Increasingly damaging to the Uzbek government’s 
international reputation is its treatment of prisoners, 
especially religious prisoners. Multiple reports have 
emerged of the common and even systematic use of 
torture by the police and security services to 
terrorise and dehumanise the latter. There is a 
regular lack of food and water, and intense 
overcrowding for all. Conditions are generally far 
worse for Hizb ut-Tahrir members than for ordinary 
prisoners. 
1. A Change in Policy Since 9/11? 
Significant international pressure on Uzbekistan 
during 2002 to improve its human rights record had 
some limited success. The number of arrests fell 
somwhat, although hundreds were still detained. 
Two human rights groups were registered, allowing 
them to work legally. In two cases, policemen and 
security service officials were imprisoned for 
murdering Hizb ut-Tahrir members in their 
custody. Nevertheless, much of the change was 
cosmetic, and the progress does not seem to have 
continued into 2003. 
In November 2002, the Uzbek government finally 
agreed under U.S. pressure to admit the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture into its prisons.178 The 
resulting report was damning and corroborated 
statements by Human Rights Watch, which has 
documented arrests, extensive pre-trial torture, 
falsified trials, and prison conditions. According to 
Human Rights Watch:  
Religious prisoners arrested and tried during 
the campaign’s earlier years continue through 
the present to suffer torture and persecution 
as they serve out their prison sentences. In 
2002 prison officials beat and raped Muslim 
prisoners to force pious men to renounce 
their faith and beg forgiveness, in part a dark 
consequence of the amnesty process. Local 
activists and former prisoners themselves 
testified that prison officials routinely 
demanded that prisoners disavow their 
religious beliefs or affiliations in order to 
attain freedom, or even simply to avoid 
physical mistreatment. In 2002 numerous 
 
 
178 Yurii Chernogaev, “Predsedatel’ oon utverzhdaet, chto v 
Uzbekistane prinimayutsya pytki,”  
www.news.ferghana.ru/detail.php?id=1161&code_phrase=
pravda cheloveka, 7 December 2002.  
convicts died under suspicious 
circumstances, but the authorities did not 
investigate their deaths.179  
The use of torture does not appear to have 
diminished significantly. Two Hizb ut-Tahrir 
members, Muzaffar Avazov and Khuzniddin 
Alimov, were apparently killed on 8 August 2002 
by being submerged in boiling water. In May 2003 
a further case was reported, when Orif Eshanov 
died apparently as a result of torture. 
Some hope was invested in the announcement of 
amnesties for political and religious prisoners, first 
in August 2001, and then in December 2002. 
According to official figures, about 860 religious 
prisoners were released under the first amnesty, and 
over 900 in the second, but there is no independent 
confirmation of these figures. 
The amnesties do represent some progress. 
However, by not applying it to those with longer 
sentences, the Karimov regime avoided releasing 
the vast majority of religious prisoners (whose 
terms averaged fifteen years in 2001).180 Secondly, 
prisoners were informally forced to repudiate their 
beliefs in verbal or written statements before they 
were released, sometimes under pain of torture. 
Many refused and were not amnestied. Thirdly, 
there have been multiple reports that prison 
authorities demanded bribes from families before 
release.181 In some cases those released were 
harassed or rearrested.182  
2. Alternative policies 
The primitive nature of Uzbekistan’s policies 
towards Hizb ut-Tahrir is recognised by some of 
the country’s intellectual elite. In 1999 an analytical 
centre close to the government wrote an internal 
memorandum suggesting that reliance only on law 
enforcement methods was ineffective.183 But the 
real decision-makers in the government are united 
in their commitment to present policies. Interior 
Minister Zokir Almatov; Deputy Prime Minister 
Karamatov; and President Karimov himself, all see 
 
 
179 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, “Religious 
Persecution of Independent Muslims in Uzbekistan From 
September 2001 To July 2002”, 21 August 2002, p. 9. 
180 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
181 Human Rights Watch, (2002), p. 9. 
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little reason to change course, partly for ideological 
reasons, and partly, in the case of the security 
forces, because the ‘Islamic threat’ is useful for 
their political position. 
Other policies promoted by the government are 
generally counterproductive. Requiring 
government-controlled imams to preach against 
Hizb ut-Tahrir while praising President Karimov in 
the same sermon, advantageously positions Hizb 
ut-Tahrir in opposition to a much disliked regime. 
The government ban on religious education in 
mosques ensures that conventional religious 
education – conducted secretly in people’s homes – 
is legally on a par with the party’s study circles. 
Instead of promoting authoritative Muslim voices 
against groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, the 
government has done its best to silence them. 
Leading religious scholar and former Mufti 
Muhammed Sodiq Muhammed Yusuf was first 
exiled and then only reluctantly permitted to return 
in 2001. Yet he is restricted in his public 
appearances, and his books remain largely 
unpublished, despite his strong message against 
both Hizb ut-Tahrir and Wahhabi groups. Instead, 
the government relies on the weak fatwas of a 
discredited Muftiate, known more for its loyalty to 
the regime than its knowledge of religious affairs. 
Most dangerously, the government has been unable 
to separate pious Muslims, some with political 
views opposed to the government but opposed also 
to political radicalism, from groups such as Hizb 
ut-Tahrir. The internal report cited above also noted 
that ‘…incompetent actions by the authorities turn 
legitimate use of law enforcement methods with 
regard to religious extremists into a struggle with 
Islam itself, which makes the ideology of Islamic 
extremism more attractive…’184 Widespread 
repression has also caught up innocent Muslims in 
the net and widened the pool of the population 
willing at least to sympathise with Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
and most importantly, very unwilling to assist the 
government in combating any real threat that might 
emerge from such groups.  
All these policies have sharply polarised society. 
On one side is the regime, largely unable to 
improve living standards or kick-start a dying 




no legal political parties and no freedom of 
expression. Hizb ut-Tahrir fits neatly into this 
vacuum, not necessarily because of innate 
radicalism among Uzbek Muslims, but primarily 
because the system allows no political alternative.  
Indeed, the system has become almost dependent 
on internal and external enemies to justify its 
continuing paralysis: if there is no serious military 
threat from Hizb ut-Tahrir or the IMU, it is not 
clear why the state needs such bloated interior 
security forces, or why it can reserve the right to 
interfere in citizens’ lives. Hizb ut-Tahrir serves as 
a useful excuse for authoritarian policies, from 
closing borders with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, to 
maintaining internal roadblocks and excessive 
powers for the security services. If it did not exist, 
the system on which much of the state is 
constructed would be under threat.  
B. TAJIKISTAN 
From 1997 to 1999, Tajikistan was perhaps the 
most liberal of the Central Asian regimes with 
regard to Islamist movements and parties. After the 
signing of the Tajik Peace Accords, which 
legitimised the constitutional role of the IRP, the 
government’s position on Hizb ut-Tahrir could be 
described as benign neglect.  
From early 2000, however, when it became clear 
that Hizb ut-Tahrir had expanded quickly in the 
North, the government’s stance became harsher. It 
set up an expert commission to investigate the 
nature of the party’s organisation and demands, 
which concluded that it was a threat to the state. 
Widespread arrests followed in 2000 and 2001. 
Local human rights advocates believe that pressure 
from the Uzbek government on President 
Rakhmonov led to this harsher treatment.185 
Security officials tend to agree: ‘If Rakhmnov 
doesn’t clamp down on Hizb ut-Tahrir, what will 
Karimov say to him?’ asked one officer.186 Arrests 
increased substantially in that period, and prison 
sentences rose from five to eight years to anywhere 
from twelve to eighteen years. In 2002, arrests and 
prison terms began to drop but there have been a 
number of new cases in 2003. Official statistics put 
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the total of criminal cases against Hizb ut-Tahrir 
through this period at 130, involving 400 persons 
but of whom only 120 were actually detained and 
50 to 60 sentenced.187 
Officials claim they have arrested some of the top 
leadership and that a major trial in March 2002 
convicted several local leaders:188 
After 11 September they went underground. 
There is a decline in activity. The reasons? 
The work of the security services, arrests: 
after 11 September the security forces opened 
their eyes. There is no real threat 
now….There are no leaders now.189 
Nevertheless, leaflets have continued to appear. 
Analysts say they detect a new style to them and 
that more are showing up in Dushanbe and other 
areas outside Sughd province. There is no direct 
evidence that the party membership is growing, 
although arrests continued regularly in 2003.  
There is no discussion of legalising Hizb ut-Tahrir 
in Tajikistan. Most security and political officials 
see it as an anti-constitutional organisation that can 
threaten a still weak state. While legalisation might 
be possible in Western societies, they claim, it is 
not possible in Tajikistan. One police general 
explained this point of view:  
For the English, Hizb is not a threat. They 
have stable salaries, a stable society: if a Hizb 
goes too far, the police will get to work, and 
hit him on the head with a truncheon. But we 
have a weak state, without a strong 
ideology.190  
Some have criticised the security forces for not 
conducting better intelligence work. One former 
KGB general said of their shortcomings:  
They don’t know Arabic, they don’t have the 
technical capacity: if there were no problems 
in the security services, there wouldn’t be 
any need for arrests now. Its more likely that 
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188 Court protocol No. 72, Sughd regional court, 28 March 
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movement in Sughd province.  
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Hizb ut-Tahrir has their person in the security 
forces, than the security forces [are] inside 
Hizb ut-Tahrir.191  
Another highly placed official admitted: ‘The 
security forces have not been able to get inside their 
organisation: only at the very lowest and middle 
levels’.192 
However, the authorities have not relied only on the 
security forces. Many local officials have used 
different methods to root out members. In Leninskii 
district, near Dushanbe, a local activist said: ‘We 
did a lot of work. We said, if the Hizb ut-Tahrir 
appear again, we will exile them, and everybody 
signed an agreement – we went round houses and 
gathered signatures from everybody. …The most 
effective method is when you say, “we’ll throw 
them out”’.193 
Unlike in Uzbekistan, there have been some 
attempts in Tajikistan to attract members away 
from the group through alternative Islamic 
education. In early 2003 teachers in one prison 
claimed that fifteen of 90 Hizb ut-Tahrir prisoners 
ended their membership after the lessons.194 But 
when asked what arguments the teachers used, the 
answers seemed primitive: 
I told them the organiser of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
was a Jew; also in their books it says that 
men are allowed to embrace women; also in 
their books its says that men are allowed not 
four wives, but five or six.195 
The lessons – called ‘Correction on the Islamic 
Path’ – take place twice a week and include basic 
reading for those who need it and the principles of 
Islam. The teachers are sponsored by Iran, and 
receive U.S.$10 per month. Many also teach in the 
Islamic university or other institutions.196  
Additional efforts by religious leaders or others to 
counter Hizb ut-Tahrir influence seem to have been 
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less effective. The increasing state interference in 
religious affairs and the dependence of much of the 
religious hierarchy on state structures do little to 
create authoritative alternative voices, particularly 
for young people. Greater government pressure on 
the IRP could also backfire, creating further 
dissatisfaction with the increasing compromises 
that the party leadership is forced to adopt to 
survive. An emasculated legal Islamist party will 
inevitably create a vacuum which more radical 
groups may fill. 
C. KYRGYZSTAN 
Kyrgyzstan’s policy on Islam generally, and on 
Hizb ut-Tahrir in particular, has gone in phases, 
balancing between the general tolerance for beliefs 
that has characterised much of government policy, 
and the increasing authoritarianism and influence of 
security forces.  
These competing demands are present in all 
discussions of policy towards Hizb ut-Tahrir. The 
General Procurator has called for harsher sentences, 
saying ‘unfortunately the fight against religious 
extremism has not produced the expected results 
because light penalties are given to those 
propagating extremist views’.197 Kyrgyzstan's 
ombudsman, Tursunbai Bakir Uluu, has questioned 
whether the party’s ideas are in fact as threatening 
as the government claims. He suggests that 
although it is extremist, it has relatively little 
support and is not engaging in violence or 
terrorism.198 
Within the security services, opinions are mixed. 
Many officers, particularly in the south, suggest 
that imprisoning members merely creates martyrs 
and draws attention to the group. Others, probably 
a minority, assert the opposite: that their hands are 
tied by the courts, and they need stricter laws and 
longer sentences.199 Hizb ut-Tahrir members claim 
that arrests are one of their best forms of 
propaganda. ‘The state helps us: they put us in 
 
 
197 Kyrgyz Tuusu, Bishkek, 1 May 2001. 
198 ICG interview with Tursunbai Bakir Uluu, 15 January 
2003, Bishkek. 
199 ICG interviews, police officers, Osh, Jalal-Abad, 
Karasu, January-April 2003. 
prison and people find out about us, and understand 
the true face of the state’.200 
Criminal cases against members rose sharply in 
2001, from eleven the year before to 86, but fell to 
41 in 2002.201 Compared with neighbouring 
Uzbekistan, the attitude of the authorities is much 
more lenient. A first offence usually warrants a 
police warning and fine of U.S.$50 to U.S.$100. A 
subsequent offence may result in a prison sentence 
of three to five years. Most cases are prosecuted 
under Article 299 of the Criminal Code, which 
forbids instigating religious and ethnic tension.202  
Although there is broad agreement that Hizb ut-
Tahrir is a potential destabilising force and little 
support for legalising its activities, there is less 
agreement on what to do about it. In the past senior 
officials have been quick to lump it together with 
the IMU or other terrorist groups, in an attempt to 
discredit it. This merely undermines government 
propaganda: there have been several occasions 
when officials initially blamed Hizb ut-Tahrir for 
terrorist or other violent attacks but were 
subsequently forced to retract. Such statements 
undermine trust in the authorities and boost those 
who claim that the government manipulates the 
issue. 
A middle-range policy seems to be emerging that is 
meant to keep Hizb ut-Tahrir in check but avoid too 
much repression for fear of radicalising their ranks 
or stirring inter-ethnic tensions. ‘We know who 
they are’, said one official, “and we make sure they 
 
 
200 ICG interview, Hizb ut-Tahrir member Aravan, 
February 2003. 
201 ICG interview with senior security official, December 
2002, Bishkek. 
202 In 2002, the state authorities reported that there were 49 
incidences of dissemination of religious literature and 41 
criminal cases; in 2001, there were 112 instances and 86 
criminal cases. In 2000, there had only been eleven 
prosecutions, the majority of which were in Osh and Jalal-
Abad provinces (especially in the Karasu district). In Osh 
province in 2002 twenty people were arrested, and 
seventeen criminal cases brought. Police seized 4,785 
leaflets, 105 books, six copies of the journal Al-Wa’ie, 31 
audiocassetes, sixteen videocassettes, and 44 bullets. In 
Jalal-Abad in 2000 there were five criminal cases, in 2001 
52 criminal cases and 20 administrative cases, all based on 
accusations of arousing religious enmity, and in 2002 there 
have been 28 cases, 24 of them criminal cases and four 
administrative cases. In 2002, seventeen of the 24 criminal 
cases reached the courts, and seventeen people were 
convicted. ICG interview with senior official, Bishkek. 
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remain within certain limits. If they step outside, 
then we act’.203 
This policy may be effective in ensuring some 
stabilisation of the situation but it does not please 
everyone in Hizb ut-Tahrir. A female member 
claimed:  
We don’t have any problems with the police 
now: they don’t even beat us up. The boys 
think they should move to Talas [in north 
Kyrgyzstan], because if the militia don’t beat 
us, it means we haven’t earned anything: if 
the police oppose us, the reaction of people is 
much stronger.204 
Since the police are probably the most unpopular 
institution in Kyrgyzstan, this logic is likely 
accurate. Hizb ut-Tahrir can always gain some 
sympathy if it claims persecution by the police. 
This is especially true in southern Kyrgyzstan, 
where the police tend to be mainly ethnic Kyrgyz, 
while Hizb ut-Tahrir members are predominantly 
ethnic Uzbeks. There have been several cases 
where arrests have almost sparked inter-ethnic 
tensions, with neighbours and friends in tight-knit 
Uzbek communities opposing Kyrgyz police. A 
softer policy serves to avoid such potentially 
dangerous flashpoints. 
Other more liberal policy ideas have included 
initiating a dialogue with the authorities. In early 
2001 this was seriously on the agenda. After a 
series of disagreements over where the meeting 
would take place and who would participate, the 
meeting was cancelled. Hizb ut-Tahrir members 
feared it would lead to their arrest, the government 
that it would be the equivalent of recognising the 
party’s legitimacy.  
In reality, this kind of dialogue would probably 
lead nowhere. While well educated members in the 
West are happy to discuss their issues in the media, 
few members in Kyrgyzstan seem capable of 
engaging in this kind of two-way conversation. 
‘You can’t talk to them’, says a leading official, 
‘they are convinced of the rightness of their cause, 
and don’t listen to other points of view’.205 Since 
the party does not wish to compete within the 
existing political system, it also seems unlikely that 
 
 
203 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
204 ICG interview, Aravan, February 2003. 
205 ICG interview, Osh, April 2003. 
legal recognition would afford any great advantage 
to the state.  
The other approach has been an increasing effort to 
use imams in official religious structures to combat 
the party. A more pro-government Mufti was 
elected in August 2002, and in December 2002, the 
Spiritual Directorate of Muslims adopted a fatwa 
against Hizb ut-Tahrir. All imams are also 
instructed to speak out against it during Friday 
prayer. Although this may have some impact, the 
state runs the danger of developing a state-led 
religious system that will lose credibility with many 
believers. The more it controls the message, the 
less impact it has. The other problem is that few 
imams are capable of arguing with Hizb ut-Tahrir 
doctrines: they do not read its literature and are not 
sufficiently versed in theology to point out where 
they go wrong.  
Also, most religious figures do not afford Hizb ut-
Tahrir the kind of importance that the government 
does. As a religious leader in Jalal-Abad said: 
‘Hizb ut-Tahrir can’t do anything. They say: “we’re 
going to build the Caliphate”, and I say to them, 
your leader announced that a long time ago, but 
you haven’t built a village, let alone the 
Caliphate’.206 
The wider policies of the government are probably 
more important than any attempts to initiate 
dialogue or intervene in religious structures. 
Reform of the security services is a key issue, and a 
strong line against abuse of power in arrests and in 
the courts is vital. Police should end their attempts 
to plant arms and other incriminating evidence on 
activists and attempt to prove guilt within existing 
criminal statutes.  
The authorities also need to conduct a more 
coherent campaign against criminal groups and 
networks in the south. Many incidents that the 
government is quick to label as the work of 
‘Islamic extremists’ are actually much more about 
growing organised crime, much of it linked to the 
drugs trade or lucrative cross-border contraband 
with Uzbekistan. Acting against these networks 
now will prevent any possible future manipulation 
of Hizb ut-Tahrir by a dangerous nexus of drug 
 
 
206 ICG interview, Dilmurad Orozov, Kazi, Jalal-Abad 
province, deputy Mufti, April 2003, Jalal-Abad. 
Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir 
ICG Asia Report N°58, 30 June 2003 Page 39 
 
 
traffickers and Islamist groups from outside the 
region.  
Moves to integrate the Uzbek minority into the 
national life of Kyrgyzstan would be a major step 
towards limiting the attractiveness of Hizb ut-
Tahrir to disaffected Uzbek youth. Improving the 
lot of the ethnic Uzbeks does not just depend on 
Kyrgyzstan, however. Central Asian Hizb ut-Tahrir 
originated in Uzbekistan and much of its continuing 
raison d’être is the wide range of policies promoted 
by the government in Tashkent that provide fuel for 
popular resentment. Instead of using the ‘Islamic 
threat’ to bolster security forces and military 
budgets, Kyrgyzstan might use it as a weighty 
argument for why Uzbekistan should open up 
cross-border trade, ease travel for all nationalities in 
the south, and begin to improve its economic 
policies. Undermining the appeal of Islamist 
sentiments in Central Asia is a joint responsibility 
of governments: at present the only cooperation is 
in the narrow field of intelligence-sharing and hard 
security.  
 
VII. THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY AND HIZB UT-
TAHRIR 
The international community has a difficult role to 
play in combating Hizb ut-Tahrir. On the one hand, 
it faces a global threat of terrorism from Islamist 
groups, and there is significant pressure on Western 
governments to increase the emphasis on security 
cooperation with Central Asian states at the 
expense of traditional emphases on human rights 
and reform. On the other hand, backing repressive 
government policies towards groups such as Hizb 
ut-Tahrir will not only backfire by probably 
radicalising members but will also confirm many 
members (and many other Muslims) in their 
conviction that the West’s role in Central Asia is 
that of uncritical supporter of dictatorial regimes, 
intent on stamping on any sign of Muslim activism. 
A. ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENT 
There is little doubt that the military interventions 
led by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
bolstered anti-Western sentiment in Central Asia, 
not just among radical Muslims, but in the wider 
community as well.207 There is little trust in 
Western motives, and this is clearly seen in the 
attitudes of Hizb ut-Tahrir to international 
organisations and Western states.  
As outlined above, the party’s literature has always 
expressed deep scepticism and antipathy towards 
the West. Much of it has been focused on Israel, 
European subjugation of Arab lands, and what is 
seen as the West’s immoral political and economic 
system. Recent leaflets have included much more 
rhetoric against the U.S. This has fed into criticism 
of the relationship between the West and Central 
Asian regimes: one recent leaflet in Uzbekistan 
accused the U.S. of actively supporting the 
Karimov regime’s oppression of good Muslims. It 
read: 
…as the Jew Karimov turned to the service 
of America, she [America] shows him real 
material and spiritual support in his war with 
Islam and Muslims. For this reason America, 
 
 
207 These attitudes will be assessed in more detail in a 
forthcoming ICG report. 
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which at the current moment is the brain 
centre for Karimov, directs to Uzbekistan, 
through Japan and the World Bank, millions 
of dollars, and teaches him [Karimov] in this 
way, how and by what means to better wage 
war.208  
This anti-Americanism is nothing new, and reflects 
wider scepticism about Western motives in Central 
Asia. But the war in Iraq, in particular, does seem 
to have accentuated Hizb ut-Tahrir rhetoric against 
the West. Much of it reflects general popular 
opposition to U.S. foreign policy, but occasionally 
it sounds much more extreme: ‘America and her 
policies is enemy number one. America should not 
exist’.209 
This geopolitical stance is matched by a wider anti-
Western feeling that is particularly acute among 
Hizb ut-Tahrir members, although some of their 
sentiments can be found among other parts of the 
populations. The party has been strongly opposed 
to the involvement of international organisations in 
Central Asia and has issued sharp criticisms of their 
activities.  
In a leaflet in Tajikistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir claims: 
‘…the organisations Red Cross and Médecins sans 
frontières conduct experiments on the population 
by spreading various infectious diseases. As a 
result, mainly children and old people die’.210 This 
kind of misinformation feeds into an older mistrust 
of external organisations, some of which comes 
from Soviet stereotypes. 
This kind of paranoia and misinformation is 
widespread among Hizb ut-Tahrir members. One in 
Jalal-Abad said:  
We know the UN well. There should either 
be Islam or the UN. They are not compatible. 
If there will be a Caliphate, there will be no 
UN, no division into different countries. The 
UN works like a spy. They don’t arrest 
Communists and Democrats, but they arrest 
 
 
208 Hizb ut-Tahrir Leaflet, Uzbekistan, December 2002.  
209 ICG interview, Osh province, April 2002. 
210 Hizb ut-Tahrir (Tajikistan), “Muborizai hukumati 
Tojikiston bar ziddi ahli da’vat,” [‘The struggle of the 
Government of Tajikistan against the chosen people’], 3 
March 2003.. 
us. It is not Akayev who is at fault. The UN 
forces him to do it…211 
Particularly unpopular among members in 
Kyrgyzstan for some reason is the largely 
innocuous Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, an international 
foundation linked to the Social Democratic Party in 
Germany, which has conducted seminars on family 
planning. One member asked, ‘Why does Ebert 
[Friedrich Ebert Stiftung] worry that Muslims have 
a lot of children? They say in Uzbekistan women 
are forced to insert coils’. 
Much of the anti-Western feeling that is expressed 
is largely mindless prejudice invoked by images of 
the West involving pornography, prostitution and 
homosexuality. These are themes repeatedly 
brought up by members, although not all are as 
aggressive as an interviewee in Jalal-Abad:  
The worst thing is that boys and girls study 
together, that’s how everything starts. There 
should also be separate buses for men and 
women, and mosques and schools. Men are 
becoming like women now, and women like 
men. …Did you know there are brothels in 
Jalal-Abad now? How can I walk with my 
children past such houses? That’s democracy. 
In America they are not people anymore, 
they have turned into animals, and we are 
going in the same direction…212 
Some of these views are impossible to counter by 
public diplomacy or other means. They are based 
on prejudices that are not amenable to argument. 
But any effort to undermine their position is 
worthwhile, and has a positive impact on the rest of 
the population. Discrediting Hizb ut-Tahrir ideas 
about Western reality would be a useful step to 
countering the party’s popularity.  
1. Banning HT? 
Whatever the dubious nature of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
ideology, a clear line should be drawn between 
terrorist organisations and armed groups on the one 
hand and those such as Hizb ut-Tahrir that do not 
carry out acts of violence. The existence of Hizb ut-
Tahrir underlines the need for a nuanced approach 
 
 
211 ICG interview with Hizb ut-Tahrir members, Jalal-
Abad, April 2003. 
212 ICG interview with Hizb ut-Tahrir member, Jalal-Abad, 
April 2003. 
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to Islamist organisations, even the very radical. 
Lumping them together with violent groups such as 
al-Qaeda merely undermines the campaign against 
terrorism and gives ammunition to those radicals 
who claim that the West is acting against free 
speech and Islam in general. 
Uzbekistan in particular has put considerable 
pressure on Western governments to ban Hizb ut-
Tahrir, claiming that it is a terrorist organisation 
and threatens global security. So far the U.S. has 
resisted calls to add the party to its list of 
international terrorist organisations. It is important 
for other Western states also to resist such 
demands: the ban introduced by Germany in 2002 
has done nothing to improve the security of 
German citizens but has merely added fuel to the 
arguments of hard-liners in Uzbekistan.213 Driving 
Hizb ut-Tahrir underground is likely to lead to its 
radicalisation and make its actions even harder to 
predict than at present. 
There is, of course, a need for close monitoring of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir activities by Western states. But it is 
as important to push Central Asian governments to 
step back from their highly repressive actions 
against members. Not only do such actions 
radicalise members in Central Asia, but they serve 
as a major campaign cause for members in the 
West. Close U.S. association with repressive 
regimes in Central Asia is a prime recruiting 
argument for the organisation in the West. 
2. Human rights and freedom of belief 
The U.S. embassy has probably done as much as 
any other in Tashkent to promote human rights 
observance, on a case-by-case basis, for Hizb ut-
Tahrir members – certainly more than most 
European embassies. But little of this human rights 
work gets significant coverage. There is a 
widespread view among Central Asians, both in 
government and in opposition, that the U.S. stance 
on human rights is largely cynical.  
U.S. officials point to the highly critical position 
taken by the government in its annual human rights 
reports. But these are seldom taken seriously by 
governments in the region. Public statements by 
 
 
213 Germany acted, however, primarily because of the anti-
Semitic nature of Hizb ut-Tahrir activity, which is, of 
course, a specially sensitive subject for the German state 
due to twentieth century history. 
U.S. officials on specific human rights abuses, on 
the other hand, are few and far between. The sense 
from outside is of a compartmentalisation of human 
rights issues from ‘high’ politics concerning 
security or economic interests. This may or may not 
be true, but it is certainly the perception of much of 
the population, and it provides a certain credibility 
to the arguments of groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir. 
Private discussions with government ministers are 
no substitute for public statements of concern that 
ensure a public distancing of the U.S. government 
from repressive policies in the region. This may 
upset some local governments but the alternative 
for the West is much worse, and the geopolitical 
impact for the U.S. is likely to be minimal. 
President Karimov will not close a U.S. military 
base because a visiting delegation makes a public 
statement on the lack of freedom of religion in the 
country.  
Other states need to take a much stronger line with 
repressive governments in the region. European 
governments are noticeably less active in general 
than the U.S. on human rights issues. The OSCE 
also needs to continue its work in the human 
dimension and its participating states to maintain 
funding for important projects in this area, 
irrespective of the complaints of some Central 
Asian governments.  
3. Wider policy issues 
The international community also needs to 
redouble efforts to shift governments towards 
reform on a range of wider policy issues. 
4. Closed political systems 
Hizb ut-Tahrir thrives in closed political systems, 
where there is little alternative for independent 
participation in politics. In Uzbekistan some very 
basic freedoms need to be introduced, with the 
legalisation of secular political parties and the 
freedoms to organise and take part in elections at 
the top of the agenda. In Tajikistan the small ruling 
elite needs to accept the reality of opposition 
parties taking part in a real political process and 
also end harassment of the Islamic Renaissance 
Party. In Kyrgyzstan an increasingly closed 
political elite will lead to frustrations for those left 
outside the system and contribute to greater 
instability, an environment which Hizb ut-Tahrir 
can only use to its advantage. 
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5. Freedom of speech  
Hizb ut-Tahrir does gain a certain influence with its 
strong criticism of governments and leaders, none 
of which appears in much of the regional press. 
Opening up the media to greater criticism is vital in 
Uzbekistan, which continues to enforce widespread 
censorship. The situation is better in Kyrgyzstan, 
but there is constant pressure on the independent 
press, and state television and other state outlets 
need significant reform. In Tajikistan there has 
been some progress in media freedom, but too 
many subjects remain largely taboo – except to the 
writers of Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets. 
6. Economic failure 
Economic reform is not a panacea for undermining 
radicalism. Rapid change, coupled with serious 
corruption, and rapid rises in wealth differentials, 
have probably contributed to the rise of Islamist 
movements in countries such as Egypt and Iran. 
But in Central Asia it is unlikely that reforms will 
have this side effect; all these negative aspects of 
‘reform’ are already present, without any of the 
positive benefits. Improving the socio-economic 
environment is important, but much more than just 
GDP growth needs to be addressed. Wider issues of 
education, employment and governance also have 
to be tackled in order to make an impact on the 
blocked aspirations of many young people. Political 
pressure needs to be placed on Uzbekistan to 
liberalise its border regime: discontent among 
trading classes too easily feeds into support for 
radical political opposition movements. 
7. Security sector reform 
The actions of police forces in Central Asia are also 
contributing to radicalisation. Human rights need to 
be at the top of the agenda, with attention 
continuing to focus on torture and abuse of 
prisoners. This needs to be a central part of 
international policy, not merely a 
compartmentalised add-on to bilateral security 
relations. Support for security services needs to be 
linked to serious reform, and assistance and advice 
provided to forces committed to change. In 
particular, helping police forces build up support in 
communities is important. 
8. Intelligence-gathering 
Intelligence work is vital, of course, as a form of 
early warning, and further research and monitoring 
of groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir is significant for 
the West. But present over-reliance on Central 
Asian security services seems to lead to poor 
information-gathering. The Uzbek security 
services, the most powerful in the region, work in a 
narrow political perspective and are significantly 
limited in their ability to analyse information 
objectively. Developing independent sources and 
increasing open research into the issue, will help 
produce better policy. 
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Many questions remain unanswered about Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s organisation – both globally and in Central 
Asia. Its financing and the depth of its international 
and domestic support is unclear. Its program and 
methods are still vague at best, and its commitment 
to non-violence is conditional, not absolute. Its 
importance should not be overestimated: it has a 
small, but significant following in four Central 
Asian states, but there is little real popular support 
for its fundamental long-term aim of building an 
Islamic state. 
The rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the environment in 
which it prospers cannot be separated. It would be 
naive to link the rise of Islamist sentiment and 
widespread poverty directly: the situation is much 
more complex and nuanced than that. But the 
party’s founder, an-Nabhani, understood exactly 
what would block the development of his 
movement: 
[Radical] … movements do not emerge when 
affluence prevails, natural rights are secured, 
prosperity is ensured, and people are selected 
to hold important positions based on their 
competence.214 
Those responding to HT should take his words 
literally. Affluence, rights, prosperity and an end to 
corruption, should be at the heart of policies to 
undermine support for radical Islamist movements 
in the region. The overarching decline in political 
freedom and the continued decline in social and 
economic conditions that characterise the Central 
Asian states, set the background conditions for 
Hizb ut-Tahrir to gain support and to further its 
anti-secular, anti-Western, anti-corruption agenda. 
There is a role for the security forces but they 
should not be the only agency which has 
responsibility for policy towards groups like Hizb 
ut-Tahrir. Extreme repression in Uzbekistan has not 
stopped the party’s activities; all the evidence 
suggests that it has only become more radical and 
that government repression has in some cases 
exported Islamist activists to neighbouring states. 
 
 
214 Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, Structuring of the Party, pp. 24-
25. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir poses serious challenges to the 
international community’s commitments to 
freedom of speech and human rights. Its views are 
opposed to the liberal and democratic consensus at 
the heart of most international organisations and 
agreements. It is playing a negative role in Western 
societies, radicalising young Muslims, a few of 
whom move on to more militant groups and may 
possibly end up involved in violence. But banning 
it would serve little purpose and only ensure it re-
emerges as an even more secretive and 
conspiratorial group, with even less possibility for 
monitoring its activities, and less vulnerable to 
pressure to refrain from more radical positions.  
The international community, for its part, has not 
managed to foster an environment for political and 
religious liberalisation in Central Asia. On the one 
hand the U.S. and EU (through the OSCE and 
bilateral relations) have continually emphasised the 
need for greater adherence to international 
standards of human rights. On the other hand, U.S. 
policy has led to close bilateral relations with 
governments that have given little sign of serious 
commitment to religious tolerance and political 
pluralism.  
Hizb ut-Tahrir has gained popularity because it 
offers an alternative to a sometimes grim reality. 
The utopia of a Caliphate may be unachievable, but 
the idea of a just order, in a state with open borders, 
and a fair economy, has attracted thousands of 
supporters. Its ideology will not be beaten by force 
alone; real reforms across the board are needed to 
undermine its support. Real socio-economic 
improvements will take time, but liberalisation is 
likely to undermine Hizb ut-Tahrir’s status rather 
than increase its support. Present state policies, 
particularly in Uzbekistan, are much closer to 
creating the conditions in which radicalism thrives 
than to eradicating it. 
 Osh/Brussels, 30 June 2003 
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The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an 
independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, 
with over 90 staff members on five continents, 
working through field-based analysis and high-level 
advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. 
ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. 
Teams of political analysts are located within or 
close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or 
recurrence of violent conflict. Based on 
information and assessments from the field, ICG 
produces regular analytical reports containing 
practical recommendations targeted at key 
international decision-takers. 
ICG’s reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and printed copy to officials in 
foreign ministries and international organisations 
and made generally available at the same time via 
the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. 
ICG works closely with governments and those 
who influence them, including the media, to 
highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support 
for its policy prescriptions. 
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from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and 
the media – is directly involved in helping to bring 
ICG reports and recommendations to the attention 
of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is 
chaired by former Finnish President Martti 
Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive 
since January 2000 has been former Australian 
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. 
ICG’s international headquarters are in Brussels, 
with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New 
York, Moscow and Paris and a media liaison office 
in London. The organisation currently operates 
twelve field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogota, 
Islamabad, Jakarta, Nairobi, Osh, Pristina, Sarajevo, 
Sierra Leone, Skopje and Tbilisi) with analysts 
working in over 30 crisis-affected countries and 
territories across four continents.  
In Africa, those countries include Burundi, Rwanda, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone-
Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in 
Asia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir; in 
Europe, Albania, Bosnia, Georgia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle 
East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; 
and in Latin America, Colombia. 
ICG raises funds from governments, charitable 
foundations, companies and individual donors. 
The following governments currently provide 
funding: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the Republic of China (Taiwan), 
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Foundation and private sector donors include  
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New York, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett 
Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation Inc., John D. 
& Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John 
Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, 
Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Ruben 
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